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THE LEWIS CARROLL OFFENSE: THE EVER-
CHANGING MEANING OF "CORRUPTLY" WITHIN
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW*
Eric J. Tamashasky*
"There is no hope in one opinion ofproviding a definitive gloss on the word 'corruptly';
neither would it be wise to try. "'
"There's certainly a core meaning to it: Conduct is corrupt if it's an improper way for a public official
to benefit from his job. But what's improper turns on many different factors, such as tradition, context and
current attitudes about legitimate rewards for particular officeholders. "2
"All law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall
be correct. In those cases then in which it is necessary to speak universally but not possible to do so
correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. "3
"Vague terms do not suddenly become clear when they are defined by reference to other vague terms."4
"While the quest for certainty in the criminal law is very much to be desired, the quest itself can be
counterproductive if the definitions of concepts like 'corruptly' become too complex, or in striving for
precision catch cases that should not be caught, or fail to catch cases that should be caught. "5
I. INTRODUCTION
Many federal statutes contain the term "corruptly." 6 Nevertheless, distinguished
The title comes from a phrase found in an article by Professor G. Robert Blakey and Brian J. Murray. In
Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, 1076
(2002), the authors imagined a defense entitled the "Lewis Carroll Defense." As prosecutors and courts are
able to shift the meaning of "corruptly" with overbroad definitions, these shifts seem to be properly
considered a "Lewis Carroll Offense." The cited passage from CHARLES L. DODGSON (LEWIS CARROLL),
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 186 (Signet Classic ed. 1960) reads "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty
said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean- neither more nor less.' 'The question
is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things."' The redefinition of the word
"corruptly" by the various circuits within different statutes is what is meant by a "Lewis Carroll Offense."
.. J.D., University of Notre Dame, 2004; M.A. Economics, The Ohio State University, 1998; B.A. Economics,
Hillsdale College, 1996.
1. United States v. Brady, 168 F.3d 574, 578 (1st Cir. 1999).
2. United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
3. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDEL HOLMES LECTURES 21 (Harvard
University Press 1958) (quoting Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, in 9 WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk.V, ch.10,
fol.1137, 1.12-28 (W.D. Ross ed., 1915)).
4. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir.1987) (en banc).
5. THE MODEL CRIMINAL CODE OFFICERS COMM., MODEL CRIMINAL CODE REPORT, (Ch. 3: Theft,
Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences) 263 (Austl., Dec. 1995).
6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (bribery of public officials and witnesses); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503,
1505, 1512(a)(l)(B), 1512(b) (2000) (obstruction of justice); 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (2000) (attempts to interfere
with administration of Internal Revenue laws).
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commissions and institutes oppose the use of the word because "corruptly" has a large
variety of definitions. 7  In fact, the majority of courts called upon to interpret
"corruptly" give it a definition that while incomplete, can be harmonized to reflect the
common law meaning of the term. Though "corruptly" in the context of Title 18
prosecutions does have a wide variety of definitions, the common law meaning already
is used consistently across the federal circuits in the context of prosecutions under 26
U.S.C. § 7212(a). The state of mind intended by the term "corruptly" is reflected in a
survey of English election law. Because the statutory structure found within English
law matches the structures within the federal criminal code, it is possible to clarify the
work that the term "corruptly" ought to do within the federal criminal law.
Abandonment of the word is not necessary. Congress should enact a general definition
in federal law, 8 or courts should consistently recognize and implement the traditional
common law definition. Either way, current confusion could be mitigated if not
eliminated by a return to common law moorings of the term.
"Corruptly," as currently used, continues to perplex courts and lawyers. In his
separate opinion in United States v. Aguilar,9 Justice Scalia wrote, "Statutory language
need not be colloquial, however, and the term 'corruptly' in criminal laws has a
longstanding and well-accepted meaning.'10 In fact, it has a longstanding meaning, but
that meaning is not well-accepted. Justice Scalia approvingly quoted the Tenth Circuit
decision United States v. OgleI I to define "corruptly."' 12 Justice Scalia agreed that a
"corrupt" act is "[a]n act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with
official duty and the rights of others.... It includes bribery but is more comprehensive;
because an act may be corruptly done though the advantage to be derived from it be not
offered by another."'13  This definition comports with the traditional common law
understanding and the way in which most prosecutions are brought. 14 Justice Scalia
went further and promulgated a classic mistake common among the circuits. He added,
"Acts specifically intended to 'influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
7. The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws referred to "corruptly" as a term
"used in existing law, which is a term of uncertain meaning" and hence "[i]n defining the culpability
requirement, the draft [the Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code] avoids reliance upon the term."
National Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code § 1361
at 127 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1970) (comment). The Working Papers associated with the Study Draft
referred to "corruptly" as an "uncertain and undefined term... used in existing law." I National Comm'n on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, I Working Papers 686(0 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1970) (comment).
The Commentary to the Model Penal Code takes an equally dismal view of "corrupt." The MPC
Commentary states that "the requirement of 'corrupt' purpose provides virtually no guidance as to the
intended scope of the law .. " MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 240.1 at 8 (A.L.I. 1980)
(comment). The Commentary also explains that "the use of the general term 'corruptly' should be abandoned
and that the issues [with] which it deals should be addressed more particularly." Id. at 5.
8. Congress did enact a provision that defines "corruptly" within an obstruction of justice statute at 18
U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2000) (applying the definition to 18 U.S.C. §1505 (2000)). The reason for the enactment,
see infra note 237, was to make it clear that "lying" to Congress was part of obstruction ofjustice.
9. 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
10. Id. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
11. 613 F.2d 233,238 (10th Cir. 1979).
12. 515 U.S. at 616 (quoting Ogle, 613 F.2d at 238 (quoting I BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 357 (2d ed.
1843)) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
13. Id.
14. See infra Part II.
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justice' are obviously wrongful, just as they are necessarily 'corrupt. ,,15 Under the
statute, however, not all acts specifically intended to influence, obstruct, or impede are
unlawful, but only those done "corruptly."' 16  While some cases conclude that acts
intended to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice are tantamount to
"corrupt" actions, 17 the inclusion of "influence" makes the statement overbroad.
Moreover, actions intended to "obstruct" justice need not be "necessarily corrupt."'
18
As Justice Scalia himself noted, "corruptly" means "with an intent to give some
advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. I 19 An effort must
be made to give content to the phrases "official duty" and "the rights of others." Only
then can content be given to the term "inconsistent." "Corruptly" does not mean simply
"wrongful" or "unlawful"21-its meaning is more precise. Hinted at by phrases such
as "improper purpose" or "evil and wicked intent," "corruptly" is giving or receiving an
unlawful benefit for one's self or another, where "unlawful" is defined by other bodies
of law focusing on "duty" or "rights." The term "unlawful" is not constrained simply
by reference to statute, but includes relevant codes of conduct. 22 The terms "unlawful"
and "improper" are now interchangeable, though when the term "corruptly" was used in
the English common law they were not.
23
Even when courts offer particular definitions for "corruptly," they often
subsequently misconstrue their own comments. For instance, an explanation for
"corruptly" occurred in the case Bosselman v. United States.24 The court explained that
"[t]he word 'corruptly' is capable of different meanings in different connections. As
used in this particular statute, we think any endeavor to impede and obstruct the due
administration of justice in the inquiries specified is corrupt."'25 Bosselman's reading of
15. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 617 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000). Section 1503 also applies to threats of force. This application is outside
the focus of this Article.
17. See Ogle, 613 F.2d at 238. In a subsequent evaluation of the Ogle decision, the Fifth Circuit omitted
the word "influence" from its summary of Ogle's holding. United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 999 (5th
Cir. 1985).
18. If an act by defense counsel "obstructed" the due administration of justice and was therefore
automatically seen as "corrupt," no room would be left for an adversarial criminal system. The line between
obstruction and good lawyering is a line drawn by the term "corruptly." See, e.g., United States v. Cintolo,
818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a defense attorney who offers a client otherwise lawful advice but
with a corrupt motive is guilty of obstruction of justice). See also United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d
Cir. 1975) (holding that because the trial judge determined a lawyer's advice to a non-client was possibly
given with both a good and a bad motive, there is not enough evidence to prove the "corrupt" motive
necessary for the obstruction conviction).
19. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 616.
20. Id. at 617.
21. Ogle, 613 F.2d at 238 ("It [corruptly] really means unlawful."). To do an act "corruptly" does
usually involve an unlawful act (assuming, of course, doing actions under color of right is prohibited by law);
but it is the difference between a necessary and sufficient condition. The court in Ogle, Justice Scalia, and
numerous other courts have made this common logical fallacy take on the appearance of validity by creating
an apparent tautology between "corruptly" and "unlawful." An act done "corruptly" might well be
"unlawfully done," but its essence is the search for an unlawful benefit or advantage.
22. This point was made by the Supreme Court in the decision United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223,
230-31 (1914).
23. See infra Part II (discussing the conflation of malum in se (unlawful) and malum per se (improper)
offenses).
24. 239 F. 82 (2d Cir. 1917).
25. Id. at 86.
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the word, however, removes it from the statute. If the prohibited conduct is "corruptly
endeavoring to impede or obstruct the due administration of justice," a construction of
"corruptly" to mean "to endeavor to impede and obstruct" renders the term "corruptly"
surplusage.
"Corruptly" does reflect different meanings in different contexts, as the Bosselman
court suggests. Those contexts, however, are not at the statute-to-statute level but exist
in case-by-case settings. In fact, the different meanings of "corruptly" stem from the
definition of "unlawful advantage."
Workable definitions of "corruptly" abound. In 1865, the State of New York's
proposed Penal Code, the Field Code, defined "corruptly" as "a wrongful design to
acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage to the person guilty of the act or
omission referred to, or to some other person." 26 In 1999, the member States of the
Council of Europe also agreed to a treaty dealing with corruption. The treaty defined
"corruption" as "requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe
or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof which distorts the proper
performance of any duty of behaviour required of the recipient of the briber, the undue
advantage or the prospect thereof."27 These sensible definitions are reflected in the
reading of some statutes.
28
The typical problem arises from lower courts' efforts to instruct juries. Appellate
courts then strain to harmonize inadequate definitions of "corruptly" into an acceptable
case-specific meaning. The problem could be resolved by modifications of those
instructions. 29 The prospect for uniformity is not good, however, since the lower courts
continue on their unreformed way because the appellate courts continue to uphold the
inadequate instructions to save convictions. This effort on the part of the appellate
courts is no longer necessary in light of changed Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding errors within jury instructions.
30
This article surveys a variety of legal materials, including English election law,
jurisprudence of the federal circuits in the contexts of the obstruction statutes (both
justice and Internal Revenue Service), and the federal bribery statute. As the various
cases within the context of bribery and obstruction of justice are presented, this article
will make an effort to apply the proposed definition of "corruptly" against the definition
exemplified by each case. This analysis demonstrates that, though the problem of the
proper definition of "corruptly" is wide-spread, its solution is not painful.
26. COMM'RS OF THE CODE, PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 765 (1865). See also PENAL
CODE OF CALIFORNIA § 7(3) (T.A. Springer 1872).
27. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, [Nov. 4, 1999], ch.1, art. 2 [Eur. T.S. No. 174] (emphasis
added).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1985) (defining "corruptly" as "an
intent to secure an unlawful advantage or benefit" in the context of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)). In fact, every circuit
that has addressed the meaning of "corruptly" within 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) has consistently applied the same
definition. See infra note 92 (collected cases).
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (holding that error in jury instructions is
reviewed under harmless error analysis).
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II. ENGLISH DEFINITIONS OF THE COMMON LAW TERM "CORRUPTLY" WITHIN
ELECTION LAWS 
3 1
The English common law concerned itself with the definition of "corruptly" in the
context of election laws. Historically, the common law split offenses into two
categories. These categories reflected the belief that some offenses were against morals
or the laws of God while other offenses were merely against the laws of man. Those
offenses against morals or the laws of God were classified under the term "corruptly."
Offenses that were against man-made laws were termed "illegal." The distinction has
all but vanished today, but a more detailed explanation of this practice illustrates the
meaning that "corruptly" once had.
The relevance to the modem definition of "corruptly" is that the type of benefit
prohibited, either an "improper" or an "unlawful" one, is currently a distinction without
difference as "corruptly" includes both types. Moreover, analysis of English cases from
the 1850s and beyond illustrates that the distinction was fading even then. The relevant
understanding from this analysis is that "corruptly" now encompasses both "illegal" and
"immoral" intentions-hence improper or unlawful benefits are prohibited by the term
"corruptly."
Historically, an argument could have been made that whether "corruptly" involves
an "improper" or an "unlawful" benefit makes a crucial difference. Though the
difference today between "improper" and "unlawful" may seem minimal, historically, it
mattered.32 The term "corruptly" permeated the election laws of nineteenth century
England.33 Halsbury's Laws of England advanced several reasons for canceling the
results of an election, including the presence of "either corrupt or illegal practices....
'34
The difference between a "corrupt" practice and an "illegal" practice was that "corrupt"
practices were considered "mala in se [while] illegal practices have been said to be
mala prohibita."35 Halsbury further explains that "[a] division of offenses favoured
[sic] by older authorities was into two classes termed mala in se and mala prohibita."
36
Mala in se offenses were "those described as offending against the rights which God
and nature had established or contrary to the moral sense of the community." 37 Mala
prohibita offenses were those that "offend[ed] against the laws which enjoin only
positive duties, and forbid things which are not mala in se, and to which were annexed a
penalty for non-compliance without making the transgression into a moral offence."
38
31. For a much more detailed treatment of the common law roots of "corruptly" and the evolution of
extortion, see Jeremy N. Gayed, Note, Paved with Good Intentions, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1731 (2003).
32. Logically, it seems that "improper" is a broader category of actions, with "illegal" actions being a
subset of that category. Some might argue in the case of "unjust laws" the picture would resemble a Venn
diagram, which is reasonable. Arguably, some "improper" things are not "illegal" (like committing adultery)
and some "illegal" things are not "improper" (like speeding on interstates). Here, we focus on the illegal
actions. Nevertheless, these distinctions are beyond the scope of this Article.
33. See, e.g., Corrupt Practice and Prevention Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 102 (Eng.) (creating offenses
for bribery, treating, and undue influence; each contains the term "corruptly").
34. 14 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 163 (1956).
35. Id. (footnote omitted).
36. 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 273 (1956).
37. Id.
38. Id. Halsbury states that this division is no longer followed, but does note that vestiges of this system
still remain. Id. For a further discussion of the origin of mens rea as a moral concept that resulted in this
2004]
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Though this distinction is no longer in favor, its value lies in the modem day
observation that "corrupt" benefits can be either "improper" or "unlawful."
A. The Misunderstood Case of Cooper v. Slade: "Corruptly" in Action
In 1854, two individuals running for elected office in England sent a letter to an
elector requesting his return to their town on the appointed day to cast his vote in their
favor.39 After the signature of the letter, the following words appeared: "Your railway
expenses will be paid."40 The election committee discussed the legality of payment for
these sorts of expenses. Its decision was ultimately made by one of the candidates
himself, who relied upon a book on election law by a distinguished jurist of the time.
4 1
The issue in Cooper was whether the payment of those expenses violated the English
Corrupt Practices Prevention Act (CPPA) of 1854. 42 The relevant portion of the CPPA
read:
II. The Following Persons shall be deemed guilty of Bribery, and shall be punishable
accordingly:
1. Every Person who shall, directly or indirectly, by himself, or by any other Person
on his Behalf, give, lend, or agree to give or lend, or shall offer, promise, or promise
to procure or to endeavor to procure, any Money, or valuable Consideration, to or for
any Voter, or to or for any Person on behalf of any Voter, or to or for any other
Person in order to induce any Voter to vote, or refrain from voting, or shall corruptly
do any such Act as aforesaid, on account of such Voter having voted or refrained
from voting at any Election .... Provided always, that the aforesaid Enactment shall
not extend or be construed to extend to any Money paid or agreed to be paid for or on
account of any legal Expenses bonafide incurred at or concerning any Election." 
43
A feature of this branch of the Act worth noting is that before a vote is cast, any
inducement via money or valuable consideration is prohibited. It is after the act of
voting (or omission in the case of a vote not cast) that the term "corruptly" defines the
conduct covered by the statute. The Lord Chancellor certified three questions for the
consideration of the eight justices and barons selected to hear the case. Those three
questions were:
1. Whether assuming the letter of the 12th of August 1854 to have been written and
sent to [the voter] by the direction and authority of the defendant in error, there was
any evidence for the jury that the defendant was guilty of bribery within the true
division between moral offenses and legal offenses, see 1 RUSSELL ON CRIME 34 (11 th ed. 1958).
39. Cooper v. Slade, 27 L.J.R. 449, 450 (Q.B. 1858). The elector traveled from Huntingdon to
Cambridge, a distance of roughly 18 miles.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 102 (Eng.).
43. Id. at s. 2.
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intent and meaning of the 2nd section of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102?
2. Whether ... there was any evidence for the jury that the letter in question was
written and sent by the direction or authority of the defendant in error?
3. Whether there was evidence that the defendant corruptly paid money to [the voter]
on account of his having voted at the election?
44
Several of the opinions in Cooper speak directly to the import of the term "corruptly"
and are worth a careful consideration.
In an opinion that answered all three questions in the affirmative, Baron Channell
observed, "In a moral point of view there may have been nothing corrupt in the conduct
of the defendant, acting on the belief that I think he did.''45 Baron Channell next looked
to the text of the statute and held that the defendant's actions did violate the statute's
prohibitions. He held, "But the defendant's conduct would have been corrupt within the
meaning of the statute if the defendant had himself promised contrary to the statute, and
had himself paid in fulfillment of his promise, after obtaining an advantage which the
statute means he should not obtain. ' 46 This section of the opinion reflects some of the
modem day understanding of "corruptly," that the act be done to secure an unlawful
advantage. It also seems to reflect the merger between mala in se and mala prohibita
offenses. If the difference still mattered in 1858, the question of whether the defendant
acted "corruptly" would have been settled by the conclusion that the defendant did not
act immorally. Alas for the defendants, Baron Channell went forward and cast his vote
to uphold their conviction based upon his statutory reading because he felt that they
violated the letter of the statute.
47
The more influential section of the opinion in Cooper was written by Justice
Willes. More recent cases still involve discussion of Justice Willes' viewpoint,48 and
even the modem day report by the UK Law Commission on Corruption mentions his
views.49  Justice Willes' discussion on the third question is both insightful and
controversial. He wrote, "I think the word 'corruptly' in this statute means, not
44. Cooper, 31 L.J.R. at 451 (Channell, B.).
45. Id. at 452.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., R. v. Smith, 1 ALL E.R. 256 (Crim App. 1960) (Lord Parker, C.J.) (stating that Justice
Willes was wrong and "corruptly" does mean something; this case falls into the category of cases this Article
argues gets Willes' position incorrect by not finishing the paragraph from which it extracts its "damning"
text).
49. U.K. LAW COMM'N, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 145: LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE:
CORRUPTION § 8.10 (1998) (stating that "[t]he difference is that Coleridge J thought this tendency [to subject
the casting of votes to influences which ought to have no weight, such as the hope of reward] is not
necessarily present in the payment of money to a voter for having already voted, whereas Willes J thought it
must inevitably be present."). The report misconstrues Willes' comments, as Willes did not believe that it
must be inevitably present (he mentioned charitable motives as an example of proper motives).
The Law Commission is an organization created to promulgate the reform of British laws. This report was on
the history of corruption legislation in the UK and several suggestions for reform. It is an excellent place to
start when researching the details of the English conception of corruption.
2004]
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'dishonestly,' but in purposely doing an act which the law forbids, as tending to corrupt
voters. . ... 50 His subsequent observation is the source of many pages of future
discussion; he wrote, "The word 'corruptly' seems to be used as a designation of the act
of rewarding a man for having voted in a particular way as being corrupt, rather than as
part of the definition of the offense." 5 1 While it has been said that he effectively read
the term out of the offense, his later comments within the same paragraph refute that
assertion. In agreeing with comments made by the trial judge, Justice Willes noted:
[I]f the moving cause of giving the money is the voter having voted for the particular
candidate, such gift is contrary to the statute, as being given by way of reward for the
vote, and therefore corrupt. This may exclude cases in which money is given from
53
purely charitable motives, though to a voter ....
Justice Willes concluded that "in the present case no other probable motive besides
the vote upon the defendant's side itself appears or can be suggested." 54  These
statements are inconsistent with subsequent views that argue that Justice Willes read
"corruptly" out of the statute; in fact, he offered a situation where "corruptly" had
meaning (when it would distinguish between a charitable motive and a vote-inducing
motive), but he was unable to muster a single plausible motive for the particular
defendant's actions that was not corrupt. Rather than reading the term out of the statute
for all of posterity, Willes recognized those circumstances where the term "corruptly"
reflects a general category of "corrupt" conduct. "Corruptly" classifies conduct rather
than explicitly defining it.55  As the conduct the statute reached was an attempt to
receive an unlawful benefit (influence an election by offering voters things of value),
"corruptly" merely acted as a designation for this sort of conduct. This view is not
entirely without historical basis, as English reference materials often distinguish
between "corrupt" and "illegal." 56 Because the offense of bribery is contained within
50. Cooper, 31 L.J.R. at 457 (Willes, J.).
51. Id.
52. A dissenting voice within the Cooper opinion leans toward this claim. Justice Coleridge seems to
discount the holding of the trial judge that if the money was paid, it was done so corruptly. Id. at 462.
53. Id. at 457.
54. Id.
55. An example of this might be the distinction between homicide and murder. Justice Willes probably
would have equated a formal charge that someone "homicidally committed murder" to a phrase like
"corruptly did bribe a voter." Our example has not formally read away the requirement of "homicide" from
the more specific category of murder, nor did Justice Willes read out "corruptly." It is this Article's
contention that there are some circumstances where "corruptly" does not bear much weight (for instance, in
18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(l)(B) and (C) (2000)) while still maintaining some meaning. When used to define
conduct already prima facie improper or unlawful, "corruptly" does not carry the same weight it does in
contexts where identical conduct can be sorted into categories of "lawful" and "unlawful" based solely upon
intent. For instance, in 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(l)(A) (2000), "corruptly" means the difference between lawful
influence of any official act (i.e. campaign contributions) and an unlawful influence (an explicit quid pro quo
to influence official decisions). See also United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that some types of obstruction implicitly contains the meaning of "corruptly").
56. See, e.g., 14 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 164 (1956) ("The following are corrupt practices: (I)
bribery; (2) treating; (3) undue influence; (4) personation (5) making a false declaration as to election
expenses; (6) incurring certain expenses without the authorisation of the election agent." (citations omitted)).
With an understanding of these offenses in mind, "X acted 'corruptly' does not unequivocally designate
which of the above offenses was committed (the corrupt action could refer to bribery, treating, undue
influence, etc.). Here "corruptly" might well be a designation of an act rather than a definition of an offense.
[Vol. 31:1
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the spectrum of offenses broadly labeled "corrupt," the statement "he corruptly offered
a bribe" is redundant.
Cooper also contains a dissent as to questions two and three. Justice Coleridge
took issue with the trial court's jury instructions because those instructions interpreted
the word "corruptly" as "purely superfluous and otiose."57 The trial judge "expressly
[told] the jury that they ought to find for the plaintiff, if they were satisfied that the
money was given by or for the plaintiff, and that the moving cause for the gift was that
[the voter] had voted for the defendant. . . ." 58 The crux of Coleridge's objection was
whether a candidate could ever pay reasonable travel expenses, for he continued, "even
though the amount was no more than the fair and reasonable expense incurred, and
though the defendant honestly believed he was committing no offense thereby." 59 The
trial judge assumed that expenses could not be given to a voter in any circumstance.
60
Such assumption was technically incorrect according to a strict construction of the
statute, but today his construction would probably have been seen as harmless error.
Justice Coleridge, continuing his exacting statutory interpretation, discussed the
presence of "corruptly" in the statute and stated that it "certainly was not inserted into
the statute without a purpose ... " 61 He observed:
"[Corruptly" appeared]: "twice in the section [section 2], in branches 1 and 2, it is
omitted in the first parts, which relate to promises and agreements to procure future
votes; twice it is inserted in the latter parts, where the reference is to votes having
been given or withheld at the election past."
62
Explaining this placement of the word, Justice Coleridge argued that "a promise to
pay money or to procure a place to induce a voter to vote for a particular candidate, can
only be made with a view to influence the voter's mind, and interfere with the
independence of the vote." 63  He further reasoned that to give any valuable
consideration
on account of the vote . . . given or withheld after the election may or may not be
within the mischief with the act was intended to prevent .... [I]t is material to bring
an act within this part of the section, that is should have been done 'corruptly' ....
[H]ere the statute expressly makes the operating motive in the mind of the party
64
material ....
This, too, is still consistent with a view that "corruptly" means an attempt to secure an improper/unlawful
advantage. In the context of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(l)(A) (2000), "corruptly" means to attempt to influence any
official act via one of the above methods.










B. The Expansion of Cooper (While Still Getting Parts of it Wrong): R. v. Smith
More than one hundred years later, the impact of the Cooper decision was still
being felt. In R. v. Smith,65 by its own admission a case about "an extraordinary man,"
the defendant, John Smith, was on a crusade of sorts against corruption. 66 The portion
of his crusade that served as the plot for this prosecution involved his efforts to induce
the city council of his town to accept a "bribe" in order to supply him with some land;
he intended to revoke the bribe after the city council's acceptance in principle of his
"offer."' 67 Having met with and sent an insurance adjuster named Lockyer to meet with
the mayor and offer the bribe, Smith "wrote a number of letters just after the time when
this offer was made by Lockyer inviting members of the press, the police, and [others]
to come down because he was going to expose some fraud."' 68 The mayor, to Smith's
great chagrin, refused the bribe from Lockyer and had both Lockyer and Smith charged
with bribery.
69
The case of R. v. Smith presented the following question:
[W]hether the word 'corruptly' in its context means deliberately offering money, or
whatever it may be, with the intention that it should operate on the mind of the person
to whom [the offer] is made so as to make him enter into what I may call a corrupt
bargain, or whether it means that the intention must be that the transaction should go
right through and that the offeror should obtain the favour for which he sought.
70
The court held that "corruptly" was used "in the former sense, namely, that it denotes
that the person making the offer does so' deliberately and with the intention that the
person to whom it is addressed should enter into a corrupt bargain." 71 This construction
of the language is not without difficulty, as the opinion noted, because "if that is all that
'corruptly' means, then it really adds nothing to the words which are already there....''72
As in the statute at issue in Cooper v. Slade, which expressly left out the term
"corruptly" when it was implicit in the conduct, Chief Justice Lord Parker contended
that "corruptly" does add meaning in that subsection "in the case of rewards or fees
given for services or favours already rendered." 73 This assertion raises the ghost of
65. [1960] 2 Q.B. 423 (Lord Parker, C.J.).
66. Id. at 426.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The bribery statute at issue in R. v. Smith was contained in section 1 of the Public Bodies Corrupt
Practices Act, 1889, which read:
Every person who shall by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person corruptly give,
promise or offer any gift, loan, fee, reward, or advantage whatsoever to any person, whether for the
benefit of that person or of another person, as an inducement to or reward for or otherwise on
account of any member, officer, or servant of any public body as in this Act defined, doing or
forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed, in
which such public body as aforesaid is concerned, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
Id. at 423.
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Cooper. Again, an English case summarizes (incorrectly) Willes' opinion in Cooper to
mean "corruptly" adds nothing to the statute (compared to adding nothing to the facts
specific to the Cooper case).74 The majority in Smith both determined that Willes' view
was that "corruptly" added nothing and cited approvingly Willes' definition of
corruptly:
The view which we have formed is, we think, confirmed by the passage which I have
already quoted from Willes, J., in Cooper v. Slade. . .. 'I think the word 'corruptly'
in this statute means not 'dishonestly,' but in purposely doing an act which the law
forbids as tending to corrupt voters....75
The Smith court upheld Smith's conviction and approved the challenged jury
instructions. 76  The jury instructions themselves are relevant to an understanding of
"corruptly" and are reproduced below.7 7
III. THE MODERN ANALOGUES OF ELECTION LAW
The structure of several key federal code provisions is parallel to the structure of
election law in the weight that the term "corruptly" bears. Title 18, United States Code
Section 201 lists two offenses: illegal gratuity and bribery.78  The difference in
seriousness between these two offenses is reflected both by their respective sentences
and by the elements required. Bribery is "unlawful gratuity" plus the state of mind
element "corruptly." Those individuals who intend to offer illegal gratuities act
corruptly-hence are guilty of bribery under federal law. This structure follows
election laws' form: offering a voter a thing of value is an offense, but to do so with
intent to influence elevates the offense to a more serious level. So, too, with bribery
and gratuity. The upshot of this situation is "corruptly" means more than "improper
74. Id. at 429 ("[T]he word 'corruptly' where used in connection with a reward to somebody who had
voted was held in effect to add nothing.").
75. Id. (quoting Cooper v. Slade, 27 L.J.R. 449, 457 (H.L. 1858) (Willes, J.)). It seems rather odd that
Willes would take the time to define "corruptly" if he felt it should mean "nothing" as the decision in R. v.
Smith contends.
76. See Smith, [1960] 2 Q.B. at 430. ("[T]he direction given by the trial judge was perfectly correct....
This mistake also occurred in the case United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 1994). Dorri, however,
contained a powerful dissent explaining exactly what the problem is with this reasoning. Id. at 892 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
77. The part of the approved jury instructions read:
The next thing to note is the word 'corruptly'. You will notice the words 'corruptly give or offer'.
What does the word 'corruptly' mean? This is law and I am telling you this as law: 'corruptly'
there means 'with the intention to corrupt'. In other words, if I offer you a reward in order that
you should do something which may help me, I am doing it corruptly-if I am offering and hoping
that the offer will induce you to act in the way in which I want you to act. Motive does not matter:
it may be that I do it because I am anxious to help myself; it may be that I am anxious to help a
widow, who, perhaps, is starving and whom I think I can help by getting a public official, a person
in public life, to do something which would help her. In one sense, I suppose, it could be said that
any such motive sprang from the best possible motive, the endeavour to help. It does not matter.
When I offer you that gift, I do it with the intention that you should so receive a reward for doing
something in connection with your public duties. This is the meaning of the word 'corrupt', intent
to corrupt, the intention to corrupt the person to whom the offer is made.
Id. at 427.
78. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (2000) (bribery) with 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2000) (illegal gratuity).
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purpose" or "evil intent." It means attempting to receive a benefit prohibited by law.
This definition comports with election law79 and with common usage within Title 26's
obstruction statute.
80
The bribery/gratuity structure exists within the obstruction/false statement area of
federal criminal law. Section 1503's obstruction ofjustice prohibition is merely Section
1001's prohibitions plus a formalized intent to benefit from the false statements,
schemes, or artifices to defraud. Those who violate the prohibitions of Section 1001
with intent to benefit are guilty of a Section 1503 violation-they perform the conduct
of Section 1001 with an intent to benefit from their unlawful/improper action, hence
acting "corruptly."
The distinction between Section 1001 and Section 1503 is illustrated by the
Supreme Court's recent treatment of the subject in United States v. Aguilar.81 In
Aguilar, a federal judge was convicted of, inter alia, uttering a false statement to FBI
agents during an investigation.82 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
reversal of this conviction, holding that Section 1503 required knowledge on the part of
a defendant that his false statement would likely be provided to a grand jury.83 The
Court determined that the evidence introduced at trial could not support the conclusion
that the intent of the false statement would have the "'natural and probable' effect of
interfering with the due administration of justice." 84 Aguilar illustrates a case where the
lesser offense of making a false statement to a federal agent was established, but the
greater offense of obstruction-requiring a "corrupt" intent-was not. Justice Scalia, in
dissent, argued that the majority's conception made the term "endeavor" irrelevant.
85
Justice Scalia stated that the majority opinion left only "a prohibition of ... actual
obstruction and competent attempts." 86 Justice Scalia's point misses the mark; while
"endeavor" does necessarily include an "intent," it does not necessarily include an
"intent to receive an unlawful/improper benefit for one's self or another." If the
jurisprudence of the federal criminal law nailed down a meaning for "corruptly," these
problems would be eliminated.
The structural similarities between gratuity and bribery and false statements and
obstruction do not encompass all possible meanings for "corruptly." They represent the
"unlawful" component found in the common law term. The "improper" component
expands the reach of "corruptly" to other areas, including custom, tradition, and things
like codes of conduct or ethics. The Supreme Court in 1914 explained that the unlawful
gain from bribery need not be formally rooted in a statute. 87 The Court noted:
Every action that is within the range of official duty comes within the purview of
these sections [the bribery sections of the federal code] .... To constitute official
79. See supra Part II.
80. See infra Part V.
81. 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
82. Id. at 595.
83. Id. at 601.
84. Id.
85. 515 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914).
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action, it was not necessary that it should be prescribed by statute; it was sufficient
that it was governed by a lawful requirement of the Department under whose
authority the officer was acting.
8 8
Moreover, the Court stated that it was not "necessary that the requirement should
be prescribed by a written rule or regulation. It might also be found in an established
usage which constituted the common law of the Department and fixed the duties of
those engaged in its activities. ' 89 To cement the merger of improper acts and unlawful
acts within the context of bribery-hence "corrupt" practices-the Court explained that
even "settled practice" constituted a guideline for judging actions under the bribery
sections.
90
IV. "CORRUPTLY" WORKING SMOOTHLY: THE CONTEXT OF 26 U.S.C. § 7212
In one area of prosecutions, federal courts apply the common law definition of
"corruptly" without exception. This rare circumstance arises in the area of obstruction
of IRS investigations covered by 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). This section will discuss an
illustrative case that both demonstrates the simplicity of the common law definition and
refutes other commonly applied definitions.
A. The Uniform Application of the Common Law Definition of "Corruptly"
The federal circuits that have addressed the meaning of "corruptly" within the
obstruction of an IRS investigation section9 1 are unanimous in its meaning.92  The
accepted definition of "corruptly" is well-illustrated by United States v. Reeves.93 In
Reeves, the court held that "corruptly" means acting with an "intent to secure an
unlawful advantage or benefit."94  The decision expressly rejected the view that
88. Id. at 230-31 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
90. Id.
91. 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2000).
92. See United States v. Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 1998) (approving jury instruction reading, "To
act corruptly is to act with the intent to secure an unlawful advantage or benefit either for one's self or for
another); United States v. Wells, 163 F.3d 889, 897 (4th Cir. 1998) ("We have interpreted the term 'corruptly'
to mean acting with the intent to secure an unlawful benefit for oneself."); United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d
1275, 1278 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Valenti, 121 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding "corruptly" means "to unlawfully secure a benefit for himself'); United States v. Dykstra, 991 F.2d
450, 453 (8th Cir. 1993) (defining "corruptly... as an effort to secure an unlawful advantage or benefit, and,
in particular, to secure a financial gain.") (internal quotation omitted); United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 423,
427 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hanson, 2 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding "[a]n act is 'corrupt'
within the meaning of section 7212(a) if it is performed with the intention to secure an unlawful benefit for
oneself or for another .... Mere evidence of an improper motive or bad or evil purpose is insufficient to
prove corruption.") (citations omitted); United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Winchell, 129 F.3d 1093, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[T]o act corruptly means to act with the
intent to secure an unlawful benefit either for oneself or for another."); United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d
1535, 1540 (1 th Cir. 1991) ("We agree with the definition [of 'corruptly'] adopted in Reeves.").
93. 752 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1985).
94. Id. at 1001.
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"corruptly" means "an improper motive or bad or evil purpose. ' 95 As many courts
accept the "improper motive" or "bad or evil purpose" definitions for "corruptly" in
other criminal statutes, 96 the logic underpinning the opinion in Reeves is enlightening.
Reeves filed a common law lien against the home of the IRS agent investigating his
tax returns.97 The lien was recorded, and it "purported to attach to [the IRS agent's]
residence and demanded payment of $250,000. " 98 Reeves was charged and tried under
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) for "'corruptly' endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of
Title 26."99 The trial judge "expressly adopted the definition of 'corruptly' as meaning
'with improper motive or bad or evil purpose. ... The Fifth Circuit reversed.
The majority opinion expressly rejected the definition used by the trial court. The
majority stated "[i]t is unlikely that 'corruptly' merely means 'intentionally' or 'with
improper motive or bad or evil purpose."' l01  "[E]ndeavor," the court explained,
"already carries the requirement of intent; one cannot 'endeavor' what one does not
already 'intend."' 10 2  Moreover, "the mere purpose of obstructing the tax laws is
'improper' and 'bad'; therefore, to interpret 'corruptly' to mean either 'intentionally' or
'with an improper motive or bad or evil purpose' is to render 'corruptly' redundant." 10 3
Judge Jolly noted that "[c]orruptly is a word with strong connotations; it is difficult to
believe that Congress included this 'key' word only to have it read out of the statute or
absorbed into the meaning of 'endeavor."' 104 The majority explained that "[S]ection
7212(a) is directed at efforts to bring about a particular advantage such as impeding the
collection of one's taxes, the taxes of another, or the auditing of one's or another's tax
records." 10 5  This statutory analysis ought to translate smoothly into the context of
Section 1503-but courts have lost the details in the translation.
The opinion in Reeves further addressed the meaning of "corruptly" within the
context of Section 1503 prosecutions. The Reeves court cited United States v. Ogle
10 6
for the proposition that obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice is "per
se unlawful and tantamount to doing the act corruptly."' 107 The Ogle decision involved
a prosecution under Section 1503 where the defendant was convicted of an endeavor to
influence a juror in a criminal matter. 108 The Ogle court summed up the trial court's
instruction as "an endeavor to influence a juror in the performance of his or her duty or
to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice is per se unlawful and
95. Id.
96. See infra Part V(A)(1) (approving "improper motive") and Part V(A)(2) (approving "evil motive").
97. Reeves, 752 F.2d at 996.
98. Id. at 997.
99. Id. at 996 (quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 997. The trial judge's opinion on the matter is reported in United States v. Reeves, 1984 WL
21209, *4 (N.D. Texas, 1984). The trial judge relied upon parallel obstruction statutes found in Title 18. Id.
at *4.
101. Reeves, 752 F.2d at 998.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quotation omitted).
105. Id.
106. 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979).
107. Reeves, 752 F.2d at 999 (citing id. at 238 )(emphasis in original).
108. Ogle, 613 F.2d at 235.
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is tantamount to doing the act corruptly."' 0 9  This language was misquoted by the
Reeves court by omitting the term "influence," making its restatement an accurate
interpretation of the statute.
110
The terms "obstruct" and "impede" inherently contain the notion that success or an
endeavor to succeed is tantamount to seeking an unlawful benefit for one's self or
another.1I I The term "influence" is problematic--one may influence the dueS 112
administration ofjustice in either a corrupt or a non-corrupt manner. The Ogle court,
focusing on its facts alone, did not appropriately limit the language by omitting the
neutral term "influence." In Ogle, the defendant endeavored to influence a juror in the
performance of her duty. The Ogle court explained that "[a]ll that [the jury] had to find
was that there was a corrupt endeavor which was an effort to wrongly influence the
[bury]."'13 The question of whether Ogle was correctly charged was not addressed, but
the discussion of "corruptly" within Section 1503 still has relevance. 
114
Not only did the Reeves court hold that the appropriate definition of corruptly is the
intent to secure an improper benefit or advantage for one's self or another, the court
explained why competing definitions must not be adopted. The majority in Reeves
evaluated the possibility of overbreadth when "corruptly" is defined as "with improper
motive or bad or evil purpose." 1 5 The Reeves court offered the example of a case
where a person under investigation by IRS agents filed a "nonfrivolous criminal
complaint" against the investigating agents, and he was protected by the First
Amendment even though the filing was "motivated by a bad or improper desire to
impede the agents' investigation." 116 The majority in Reeves explained that even if the
filing was not protected by the First Amendment, current doctrine holds that
overbreadth is possible when activities come close to protected areas. 117 To avoid
creating this problem, and following a Supreme Court admonition to avoid construing118th Revscutcnlddtaa
statutes in a manner that might be unconstitutional, the Reeves court concluded that a
different definition of "corruptly" was required. The majority concluded that the
definition of "corruptly" that avoids constitutional problems must be "an intent to
109. Id. at 238.
110. Reeves, 752 F.2d at 999 ("Thus, 'to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice is per se
unlawful and tantamount to doing the act corruptly."')
11l. The court in Reeves said as much. The court noted that "where a defendant has endeavored to
obstruct a criminal proceeding, the 'advantage inconsistent with the duties and rights of others' is so clear that
courts have often been willing to impute the desire to obtain such advantage on a per se basis." Id.
112. E.g., an attorney may file for a continuance in a matter. If the lawyer does so for an ethical reason,
no evidence of corruption may be found. If an attorney files for a continuance to prolong litigation to harass
the opposing party, "corruption" is arguable.
113. Ogle, 613 F.2d at 239.
114. The conduct complained of in Ogle involved a corrupt endeavor to influence a petit juror. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503 contains express prohibitions against this conduct. Whether the "omnibus" provision is the
appropriate language for an indictment on these facts is an open question beyond the scope of this article.
115. Reeves, 752 F.2dat 1001.
116. Id. (citing United States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106, 1112 (5th Cir. 1983) (Hylton held that a non-
frivolous petition to the government for redress of grievances cannot be the crime of obstruction) (citation
omitted)).
117. See id.
118. The court cited Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), for the proposition that "[T]he Court has a
duty to construe a federal statute to avoid constitutional questions where such a construction is reasonably
possible." Reeves, 752 F.2d at 1001 (brackets in original).
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secure an unlawful advantage or benefit."' 119 This construction is followed in all eight
of the federal circuits that have addressed the definition of "corruptly" within the
context of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) prosecutions.
120
Further illustrations of why a definition of "with improper purpose" should fail
may be found in Judge Gee's concurrence in Reeves. Judge Gee observed that "the
essence of § 7212(a) seems to be the attempt to influence or impede the government
agent's official actions. ... ."121 Judge Gee pointed out several actions that might be
done "with improper motive"; one of these actions was "paying one's tax with sacks of
pennies."' 122 The motive behind paying with pennies might be "simple contrariness...
*,,123 In that case, while a taxpayer might be acting in an annoying fashion, he cannot be
said to be acting "corruptly." In the context of Section 1503, imagine a witness who
submits truthful documents to a grand jury in 72 point font. While this conduct might
be characterized as "simple contrariness," it ought not be considered "corrupt" for
purposes of federal criminal prosecutions.
The Reeves decision contains a pragmatic dissent by Judge Williams. While Judge
Williams would have upheld the conviction on the facts of the case, he does grant that
"even if the district court did interpret the word 'corruptly' too broadly in reaching its
conclusion in this case, the error was clearly harmless." 124 He further noted that "[t]his
was not a trial to a jury. The critical words were not contained in instructions to a
jury.' , 125  Finally, Judge Williams observed that "[a]ssuming that the court's
interpretation of the word 'corruptly' was too broad to be a proper jury instruction, the
issue before the court was whether the action of this accused in placing this false and
fraudulent lien on the property of the IRS agent was corrupt." 126 In answering this
question, Judge Williams stated that "[b]y any definition of the word [corruptly] it was
[corrupt to file the lien]."'127 While a reasonable position, this desire to uphold the right
result in a given case handicaps the true meaning of "corruptly" in general use. Judges
ought not ignore the means utilized to reach a given end.
B. The Jury Instruction that Reflects Both the Common Law and Case Law
The Seventh Circuit, which approves different definitions of "corruptly" in its jury
instructions for bribery and obstruction of justice, 128 gives the traditional common law
definition for "corruptly" within Section 7212.129 The definition of "corruptly" within
Section 7212 is the definition that should be applied across the various sections of Title
119. Reeves, 752 F.2d at 1001.
120. See supra note 92 (citing cases from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits approving the same definition).
121. Reeves, 752 F.2d at 1002 (Gee, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1004 (Williams, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Reeves, 752 F.2d at 1004.
128. See infra note 138 (18 U.S.C. § 1503 - Obstruction of Justice) and note 147 (18 U.S.C. § 201 -
Bribery).
129. It is also the only circuit with a definition for "corruptly" within § 7212(a).
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18 and adopted by the other circuits: "The word 'corruptly' means that the act or acts
were done with the purpose to secure an unlawful benefit for oneself or another by
obstructing or impeding the administration of the internal revenue laws." 130  This
definition perfectly captures the "unlawful benefit" or "advantage" language that would
allow for one definition of "corruptly" across offenses and the circuits. It also
demonstrates the how to write a single definition of"corruptly." It is interesting that the
Seventh Circuit follows Reeves' definition (and therefore its reasoning) in defining
"corruptly" within Title 26, but refuses to do so within Title 18.
V. THE SELF-PERPETUATING PROBLEM OF PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The misleading definitions of "corruptly" originate in the pattern federal jury
instructions. Without a substantive rewrite of these instructions, appellate courts will
continue to struggle to acknowledge the traditional common law definition of
"corruptly." Correcting these instructions would effectively eliminate a vast amount of
federal appellate litigation involving the term's meaning within specific statutes.
131
This section first will survey the different definitions of "corruptly" proposed by the
federal pattern jury instructions and conclude with a workable model for correction
based upon the model instructions for "corruptly" within the context of 26 U.S.C. §
7212(a).1
32
A. "Corruptly" in the Context of Bribery
In the suggested federal jury instructions for bribery, the term "corruptly" is
defined as "[an act] performed voluntarily and deliberately and performed with the
purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or unlawful result or of accomplishing
some otherwise lawful end or lawful result by any unlawful method or means."1 33 The
definition continues to state that "[tihe motive to act 'corruptly' is ordinarily a hope or
expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to one's self, or some aid or profit to
another." 134 This definition, technically, is correct as it does encapsulate the effort to
130. FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7212 (1999) [hereinafter
SEVENTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
131. See infra note 132 (explaining that California courts face little litigation on the question of
"corruptly" since the State's definition of "corruptly" comports with the common law definition endorsed by
this Article).
132. This Article does not examine the pattern jury instructions of the several states, but it is interesting
that California's jury instructions contain the definition of "corruptly" rooted in the common law. The
instruction reads, "The word 'corruptly' means with a wrongful design to acquire or cause some monetary or
other advantage to the person guilty of the act or omission referred to, or to some other person." 1
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 7.00.5 (7th ed. 2004). This definition is not overly surprising,
since the Penal Code of California adopted the same definition in 1872. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(3) (West
1999) ("The word 'corruptly' imports a wrongful design to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other
advantage to the person guilty of the act or omission referred to, or to some other person."). There are very
few California state cases on the meaning of the term "corruptly." Presumably, it is because the definition
California enacted from the Field Code has been clear enough that defendants do not find it worth
challenging.





obtain an advantage (the financial gain or benefit), though the concept of "advantage" is
replaced by the long phrase "financial gain or other benefit to one's self, or some aid or
profit to another." Moreover, the "unlawful" characterization in the definition of the act
is not carried into the "motive" portion. To maintain this definition, the "financial gain
or benefit" should be explicitly labeled unlawful.1
35
The Fifth Circuit has a different instruction that defines "corruptly." The Fifth
Circuit approves the following statement: "An act is 'corruptly' done if it is done
intentionally with an unlawful purpose."' 136 This definition, which seems to simply
collapse the "unlawful end or unlawful result or of accomplishing some otherwise
lawful end or lawful result by any unlawful method or means" language employed by
the other circuits into "unlawful purpose," is only lacking the explicit understanding
that the "unlawful purpose" is actually some "unlawful benefit." This instruction, as
drafted, does not describe a meaningful definition of the term "corruptly." Because
"corruptly" is found within criminal statutes, the acts it is supposed to describe are
necessarily "unlawful." Defining it to mean "intentionally with an unlawful purpose" is
not illuminating.
137
The Seventh Circuit, in the context of bribery, has a jury instruction that reads in
part, "corruptly [means] with the purpose, at least in part, of accomplishing either an
unlawful end result, or a lawful end result by some unlawful method or means."' 138 The
Seventh Circuit's version can be harmonized to the "advantage" language by noting that
an "unlawful end result" and "a lawful end result by some unlawful method or means"
both contain the implicit undertone that the person seeking either of those two results
seeks an "improper benefit." The Comments to this section of the Seventh Circuit
pattem instructions contain a citation to Roma Construction Co. v. aRusso, a case that
supports an interpretation of "corruptly" to mean "unlawful benefit."'139 The current
instruction, as written, fails the test of § 201(b)(1)(A). It is not bribery to influence any
official act, it is bribery to influence an official act "corruptly." The seeking of an
"improper benefit" (i.e. the receipt of an official act because of unlawful gratuity) is the
conduct prohibited. If a court only has "unlawful end result" (ostensibly, influencing
official acts) or "lawful end result by some unlawful method or means" to work with,
the comment in the dissent to United States v. North decision will ring true: "[W]e
might as well convert all of Washington's office buildings into prisons."
140
135. See supra text at note 346 (dissent's discussion of this instruction in United States v. Dorri).
136. FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL CASES § 2.12 (2001) [hereinafter FIFTH
CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (discussing instructions for 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)); see also FIFTH CIRCUIT
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.13 (200 1) (same definition for § 201 (b)(2)).
137. See supra Part IV(A).
138. SEVENTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 201 (1999).
139. Id. committee cmt. (citing Roma Const. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566 (1st Cir. 1996)). aRusso
interprets "corruptly" as "the intention to obtain ill-gotten gain .... aRusso, 96 F.3d. at 574. This
conception is consistent with the definition supported by this Article and similar to the Seventh Circuit's
version.
140. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 942 (1990) (Silberman, J., concurring dubitante in part and
dissenting in part).
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B. "Corruptly" in the Context of Obstruction of Justice
The obstruction ofjustice offenses maintain the following definition of "corruptly":
"To act 'corruptly' as that word is used in these instructions means to act voluntarily
and deliberately and for the purpose of improperly influencing, or obstructing, or
interfering with the administration of justice."' 14 1 While this definition is circular, it can
be harmonized with the proper "undue advantage" language. Note that the definition
includes the adverb "improperly" which modifies "influenc[e]," "obstruct[]," and
"imped[e]." The logical conclusion is that there is a way to properly "influenc[e],"
"obstruct[]," or "imped[e]" the "administration of justice."'142  Rather than create
statute-specific definitions for a single term, the use of the "undue advantage" language
would create a consistent definition from statute to statute. In the case of obstruction of
justice, the "undue advantage" sought after will be the improper interference with the
administration of justice. The differences between definitions need only be considered
semantics for the correct interpretation to govern. This type of confusion was noticed
even in the 1800s in the English case County of Norfolk (Northern Division) Election
Petition.143 The judge noted that varied definitions of "corruptly" were common, and
observed that "[t]he words may have varied; different judges may have used different
words, but the meaning has been always the same." 144  In the context of English
election law, the "advantage" prohibited by statute was the giving of "meat and drink"
with "the intention of influencing the voters at this election .... 145
The Fifth Circuit has a separate definition of "corruptly" within Section 1503. The
jury instruction states, "'[C]orruptly' [means] that the defendant acted knowingly and
dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the due administration of
justice."' 46 Again, this definition does nothing more illuminating than reference the
conduct prohibited. The Seventh Circuit's definition is no better. The Seventh
Circuit's instruction reads, "corruptly, that is, with the purpose of wrongfully impeding
the due administration of justice."'147 In this instruction, "wrongfully" is the word
chosen to mean "acquiring an undue advantage." The Ninth Circuit, in the context of
Section 1503, defines "corruptly" as an act "done with the purpose of obstructing
justice."'148 Again, these are all circular definitions.
C. "Corruptly" Done Correctly: 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (a)
The Seventh Circuit, which approves different definitions for "corruptly" in its jury
instructions for bribery and obstruction of justice, has a different definition for
"corruptly" within 26 U.S.C. § 7212.149 The definition for "corruptly" within Section
141. O'MALLEY, supra note 133, § 48.04.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
143. 21 L.T.R. 264, 269 (1869).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. FIFTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.66.
147. SEVENTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1503.
148. NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 8.108 cmt. (2000) [hereinafter NINTH
CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
149. It is also the only circuit with a definition for "corruptly" within § 7212(a).
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7212 is what should be applied in a consistent manner across the circuits: "The word
'corruptly' means that the act or acts were done with the purpose to secure an unlawful
benefit for oneself or another by obstructing or impeding the administration of the
internal revenue laws." 150 This definition perfectly captures the "unlawful benefit" or
"advantage" language that would allow for one definition of "corruptly" across circuits
and offenses. It also demonstrates how to construct a complete definition of
"corruptly."
D. The Way to Tailor "Corruptly" to Different Statutory Contexts
The definition "with the purpose to secure an unlawful benefit for oneself or
another" can be tailored to each context in which "corruptly" appears. To demonstrate
this, the Seventh Circuit's definition may be broken into two parts: the first part consists
of the phrase "done with the purpose to secure an unlawful benefit for oneself or
another" and the second part contains the phrase "by obstructing or impeding the
administration of the internal revenue laws." 151 To create a consistent definition of
"corruptly" specific to each statute, committees drafting pattern instructions should
consistently take the first part and add the relevant statute-specific text to form a
corresponding second part. For instance, to create a definition of "corruptly" for
bribery under Section 201 (b)(1)(a), one would take the language "done with the purpose
to secure an unlawful benefit for oneself or another" and add the phrase "by giving any
thing of value to a public official with intent to influence an official act." This
construction makes it explicit that one can give a public official a thing of value with
intent to influence an official act as long as the purpose is not to secure an "unlawful"
benefit. Breathe safely Congress, campaign contributions and logrolling, as are the
current custom, are still lawful. In the context of Section 1503's "obstruction of justice"
language (rather than Section 7212's parallel language "obstruction of internal revenue
service laws"), a straightforward application of the above method would create the
following definition: the word "corruptly" means "that the act or acts were done with
the purpose to secure an unlawful benefit for oneself or another by obstructing or
impeding..."'152 the "due administration of justice."' 153  The "benefit" language
simplifies the complicated decisions of the past. For example, the issue in the Cintolo
decision 154 was whether a lawyer's admonition to a client to take his Fifth Amendment
right during a grand jury could be "corrupt" within the meaning of Section 1503.155
The nature of the benefit sought draws the line between corrupt conduct and lawful
conduct on the part of an attorney. In Cintolo, William Cintolo was found guilty of
attempting to confer an unlawful benefit for underworld associates by manipulating his
client under a definition of "corruptly" as an intent to "obstruct or impede . . . the due
150. SEVENTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7212.
151. Id.
152. SEVENTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7212.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
154. See discussion, supra note 18.
155. United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 990 ("We have previously held that '[a]n effort to alter the
testimony of a witness for corrupt purposes is plainly an endeavor to impede the due administration of
justice."').
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administration of justice." 156  There were several amicus briefs filed that were
concerned that the effect of a ruling upholding Cintolo's conviction would be to "chill"
the representation of the defense bar.15 7  If the court had applied the common law
definition of "corruptly," those amicus briefs would not in all likelihood have been
filed. The definition accepted within Cintolo is disturbing. The intent to "obstruct the
due administration of justice"' 158 is circular; it is limited only the by discretion of a
federal prosecutor in making his charging decision. The definition "with intent to
receive an unlawful benefit by obstructing the due administration of justice" does not
create the fears expressed by the amicus. An attorney acting lawfully within his powers
to help his client would have nothing to fear. This construction is supported by the
structure and text of the obstruction of justice statutes. Section 1515(c) explicitly states
that "[t]his chapter ... does not prohibit or punish the providing of lawful, bona fide,
legal representation services in connection with or anticipation of an official
proceeding."' 159  Legal representation, so long as consistent with the law and ethics
codes, is not captured by this chapter via both Section 1515(c) and a correct definition
of "corruptly."
VI. EXPLORING THE MEANING OF "CORRUPTLY" WITHIN OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Generally, the definitions of "corruptly" in the obstruction of justice statutes
adopted at one time or another by various circuits illustrates the full spectrum: "with
improper purpose," "with evil or wicked intent," or "with intent to obstruct justice."
Yet each of these definitions is overbroad. 16  Unfortunately, the courts do not focus on
the overbreadth of the definitions because the conduct at issue is manifestly prohibited
by the statute regardless of which definition is applied. 161 Though this situation has
given rise to the wide variances in the definition of "corruptly" between and within the
circuits, jurisprudence is not well-served to use a definition merely because it does not
result in an injustice in a particular situation.
The various circuits are in disagreement about the meaning of "corruptly" within
Sections 1503, 1505, and 1512. Meanwhile, Congress proceeds on the assumption that
the courts are using a unified definition.
162
156. Id.
157. Id. at 996.
158. Id. at 990-91.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c) (2000) (brackets omitted).
160. See supra note 101 et seq. and accompanying text (discussing the Reeves refutation of "with
improper purpose" or "with evil or wicked motive"). There is not a decision at the federal level that quarrels
with the definition used in the context of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) as of publication of this Article.
161. Judges have endorsed the view that because certain conduct fits all conceivable definitions of
"corruptly" the instruction given in the case is not essential. See, e.g., United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995,
1004 (Williams, J., dissenting).
162. The House Report accompanying the bill that created the present-day bribery section 201 stated that
"[t]he word 'corruptly' which is also used in obstruction-of-justice statutes (18 U.S.C. 1503-1505), means
with wrongful or dishonest intent." H.R. 748, 87th Cong. (1962). The amendment to 1512 that created the
"corruptly persuades" language was part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4181. Senator Biden,
in the Congressional Record, stated the purpose of the 1988 amendment was "merely to include in section
1512 the same protection of witnesses from non-coercive influence that was (and is) found in section 1503."
134 CONG. REc. S 17300, S 17369 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Senator Biden). This information is
found in the dissent to United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1997) (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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In most cases, the exact definition of the term "corruptly" does not affect the
outcome of a trial. Juries "know" that a person who kills a witness obstructed justice.
Juries "realize" that threats to witnesses obstruct justice. Juries do not realize, for
example, that a lawyer suggesting her name be removed from a memo is not obstruction
of justice but professional responsibility. 163  Under the traditional common law
definition, 164 jurors would not be so easily confused.
A. Section 1503 and "Corruptly"
The language of the obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 1503,165
parallels the language of 26 U.S.C. Section 7212(a). 166  Nevertheless, while the
construction of "corruptly" under Section 7212(a) is consistent within and between the
circuits, 167 the construction of "corruptly" within Section 1503 is in disarray.
1. "With Improper Intent" and/or "With Evil or Wicked Intent"
In United States v. Brady, 168 after noting the difficulties involved with the word
"corruptly,"' 16 9 the First Circuit held that "it is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy the
The dissent in Farrell concluded that "[g]iven this background, it is logical to attribute to the 'corruptly
persuade' language in § 1512, as adopted by Congress in 1988, the same well-established meaning already
attributed by the courts to the comparable language in § 1503, i.e. 'motivated by an improper purpose."' Id.
So, if § 1512 is equivalent to § 1503, which is equivalent to § 1505, it seems like the meaning of "corruptly"
should be consistent across each statute. As this part will demonstrate, it is not. Moreover, the preceding
discussion is useful for equating the parts, but the definition advocated, i.e. "with improper motive," requires
the refinements of history to adequately serve the common law purpose.
163. For a brief, but insightful, discussion of this phenomenon with respect to the Andersen verdict, see
Stephen Gillers, The Flaw in the Andersen Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A25.
164. As based on English Election law, the New York Field Code, the California adoption thereof, and the
modem California statutory definition.
165. The full text of the relevant provisions for the purpose of this discussion is reproduced below:
(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication,
endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court
of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before
any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or
injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or
indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any
such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account
of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening
letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). If the
offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, and the act in
violation of this section involves the threat of physical force or physical force, the maximum term
of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise
provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in
such case.
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
166. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000) with 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2000).
167. See infra Part IV.
168. 168 F.3d 574 (1st Cir. 1999).
169. The Brady court stated that "[t]he scienter element in the obstruction statute is the subject of more
confusing case law than can be described in brief compass." Id. at 578. The court went on to write, "There is
no hope in one opinion of providing a definitive gloss on the word "corruptly"; neither would it be wise to
try." Id. While the latter statement is arguably untrue, the former is most definitely accurate. The problem,
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'corruptly' requirement in the statute-without regard to other circumstances that might
also establish corruption (e.g., offering a bribe)-if the contemnor's purpose for
refusing to testify is to prevent the grand jury from locating the criminals."'170 The court
then noted that "[t]his is broadly consistent with a standard instruction for the
obstruction statute, 17 1 captures most of the malign cases, and will need qualification
only in the rare cases where such a purpose may be privileged by law or otherwise."
172
Brady does not reference the complete definition of "corruptly," 173 but the caveat that
qualification will be required when a purpose may be privileged by law or otherwise is
nothing more than "an unlawful benefit/advantage."
In United States v. Fasolino,174 the defendant appealed his conviction under section
1503 claiming insufficiency of the evidence against him. 175  Fasolino twice asked
someone who knew the sentencing judge to take the judge to lunch in order to secure a
more favorable sentence. 176  The acquaintance of the judge outright denied each
request. 177 Fasolino later spoke to a government informant and claimed that "I've got a
guy going in to straighten that out. . . . My man's having lunch with [the judge]
tomorrow."' 178  The per curiam opinion defined an action "corruptly" done to be
"motivated by an improper purpose."1 79The Court then found that the statements
demonstrated an "improper purpose" sufficient to convict for "corruptly" endeavoring
to obstruct justice. 180  The Fasolino definition of "corruptly," that is, "for improper
purpose," continues to be used.
181
as we argue, is that the word "corruptly" has become unmoored from its common law roots. As the word
drifts aimlessly from statute to statute, and is subsequently interpreted to mean different things, it would be
difficult for one court to provide a definitive gloss using only court decisions. For that reason, we have
gathered the common law history of "corruptly" in an effort to create a definitive gloss. We hope this
common law history will result in a consistent meaning to the term "corruptly" within the federal criminal
law.
170. Id. at 578-79.
171. Id. at 579 n.3 (The instruction the court referenced was: "The word 'corruptly' means simply having
the improper motive or purpose of obstructing justice." 2 Sand et al., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
Instruction 46-6, at 46-24 (1998)). (This is a slight oversimplification, as Sand itself admits, see id. at 46-11,
but it captures the thrust of the term.) It is interesting that a federal appellate court is satisfied with an
"oversimplification" of the term "corruptly." Other courts have argued that a mere "improper motive or
purpose" is too vague to be useful. See United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding
it is "unlikely" that "corruptly" means "with an improper purpose").
172. Brady, 168 F.3d at 579.
173. As advocated by this Article as "with the purpose to secure an unlawful benefit for oneself or
another."
174. 586 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1978).
175. See id. at 940.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 941.
179. Id. (citations omitted).
180. Fasolino, 586 F.2d at 941. The Court stated, "We agree with the government that an endeavor to
exploit such a relationship [with someone who knew the judge], actual or perceived, may be found to be
corrupt." Id.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Thomson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Fasolino, 586 F.2d at
941)). Thompson holds that § 1503's "corruptly" and § 1512's "corruptly" mean the same thing: "We
interpret § 1512(b)'s use of that term in the same way, and, as thus interpreted, the section is not
impermissibly vague." Id. at 452. This interpretation matches Congress's definition for § 1505's "corruptly":
"As used in section 1505, the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by
influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or
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On the other hand, the Second Circuit was more explicit in defining "corruptly" in
United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 182 where the court of appeals reversed a conviction
under section 1503 because the government did not adequately prove the mens rea of
the defendant. 183  In Sun Myung Moon, the defendant was subpoenaed to produce
several documents; the defendant knew these documents were fraudulent, but produced
them nonetheless. 184 The court found that there was no evidence introduced that the
defendant could have resisted production, and therefore reasonable doubt existed as to
whether or not the defendant displayed a "corrupt intent." 185 In this case, submitting
false documents, with "ample proof of their being falsely backdated" to a grand jury
was found not to be actionable under Section 1503.186 Using the definition of
"corruptly" found in the common law history, the court would have upheld this
conviction. 187  This would have been an attempt to receive an unlawful benefit-
unlawful in that the knowing presentation of false writings or documents to any branch
of the government is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3). The benefit sought could be
the impact of the false statements upon the grand jury investigation. Under existing
definitions of "corruptly," this conduct is acceptable. The Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Haas188 followed a definition containing both "an improper motive" and an "evil or
wicked purpose." 189 Haas was followed with little comment in the subsequent decision
United States v. Stratton. 19  These decisions illustrate the persistent use of an
overbroad definition among the federal circuits.
destroying a document or other information." 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2000). A natural reading of this sort of
definition would be to extend it to all uses of the term "corruptly" within this chapter of Title 18.
Nevertheless, Congress demonstrated its ability to extend definitions to the entire chapter of Obstruction of
Justice offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c): "This chapter [18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1501 et seq.] does not prohibit or
punish the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in connection with or anticipation of
an official proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c) (2000). That Congress explicitly did not extend this definition
of "corruptly" to the entire chapter leaves open the construction that "corruptly" means something different in
sections other than 1505. The Congressionally-stated purpose of the § 1515 definition was to set aside the
decision in United States v. Poindexter. 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding "corruptly" in the
context of § 1505 is unconstitutionally vague). Poindexter is discussed infra at Part V(b)(2). Sadly, Congress
did not take that opportunity to deal with the "vagueness" of the concept throughout Title 18.
182. 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983).
183. Id. at 1236.
184. Id.
185. Id. ("Whether or not [the defendant] could have resisted production, as the government argues,
evidence of this government theory was not before the trial jury. Without it, a reasonable doubt as to [the
defendant's] mens rea exists.").
186. Id. ("[T]he government answers that Kamiyama's corrupt intent was adequately demonstrated by the
facts that he could have resisted production of the documents on Fifth Amendment grounds and that he
vouched for the accuracy of the documents in his testimony before the grand jury."). The court found this
unpersuasive as there was no proof on the record he had vouched for the accuracy of the documents. See infra
note 185.
187. Had the questions posed been: Does a citizen have a duty not to present false documents to a grand
jury? Did the defendant know that the documents were false? If the answer was "yes" to both, a case could
be made that the defendant corruptly endeavored to obstruct justice.
188. 583 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1978).
189. Id. at 220.
190. See 649 F.2d 1066, 1075 (5th Cir. 1981) ("However, in United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 219-21
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980, 99 S. Ct. 1788, 60 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1979), this court held that the
words "corruptly did endeavor to" the language used in the indictment in the case at bar was indeed sufficient
to allege a knowing, intentional and willful act.").
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2. "With Intent to Obstruct Justice"
The Fourth Circuit equated "corruptly" with "the intent to influence, obstruct, or
impede [a] proceeding in its due administration of justice."1 9 1  In United States v.
Littleton,192 the court overturned a conviction for perjury and obstruction of justice on
the grounds that the false testimony was not "relevant." While the perjury reversal is
correct, the fact that the court drew the conclusion that the obstruction of justice charge
cannot stand is odd, at least under a correct view of "corruptly."' 193 The majority view
was that the government did not extract from Littleton her exact intent in regards to her
"allegedly" false testimony.1 94 This perspective drew a strong dissent:
Carrie Littleton testified falsely at a suppression hearing before the district court that
her son called her at work at 3:15 p.m. on July 21, 1992, and requested her to come to
the police station and obtain a lawyer for him and that she arrived at the police station
at 3:45 p.m. for that purpose. By giving this testimony, Littleton intended to
corroborate her son's position that during detention he had requested a lawyer and
therefore his statements, incriminating him in a murder, were taken in violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Littleton's testimony was intended to support her
son's position.
19 5
It is not inappropriate to state Littleton "intended to corroborate" the position of her
son; the jury did find her guilty of obstruction, which does require intent.196 How the
majority managed to overlook the finding of intent and claim Littleton had no idea how
her testimony might help her son is beyond comprehension. 197 Returning yet again to
191. United States v. Grubb, II F.3d 426, 437 (4th Cir. 1993).
192. 76 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 1996).
193. See id. at 618. The court notes, "We reach the inescapable conclusion that Littleton testified to
nothing at the suppression hearing that could have conceivably influenced the district court to suppress her
son's confession. Her entire testimony was, therefore, immaterial to the court's inquiry, and, as a result, her
perjury conviction must be reversed." Id. This is an obvious point of statutory construction in that the perjury
statute states "Whoever under oath ... in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the
United States knowingly makes any false material declaration .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (West Supp. 1995).
Since § 1623 requires the false statements to be "material" and the court determined that her statements were
not, perjury must fail.
This finding should not automatically kick the obstruction of justice charges. False statements, against the
oath undertaken by a witness, would serve as the responsibilities violated by a "corruptly" acting witness.
Since her statements were intended to obstruct justice (an inference made based on the jury finding that she
had done so), but could not based on their apparent non-materiality, under the common law meaning of
"corruptly" she could still face obstruction of justice charges. As many cases have pointed out, it is the
"endeavour" that matters; it is not important for obstruction ofjustice charges whether or not the "endeavour"
was successful. In this case, a correct understanding of the word "corruptly" would have allowed a successful
prosecution against someone who intended to mislead a grand jury but merely was not smart enough to
fashion "material" lies.
194. Littleton, 76 F.3d at 619. ("The government's evidence was likewise insufficient to permit the jury to
ascertain that Littleton intended to obstruct justice. There was, for example, no direct or circumstantial
evidence that Littleton had contrived with Kelley, his attorney, or any of the defense witnesses to fabricate her
story.") One must wonder why the court felt Littleton needed to contrive with anyone to make up a story.
195. Id. at 620 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. The majority stated, "That Littleton understood the purpose of the suppression hearing, was aware of
the importance of the evidence that Kelley sought to suppress, and desired the district court to grant her son's
motion, does not establish that she understood how her testimony would assist in accomplishing that
20041
Journal of Legislation
the two step analysis: What were her duties? Answer: she presumably took an oath to
tell the truth. Next question: Did she tell the truth? Answer: No. Why? She intended
to secure an advantage for her son. Was it a "lawful advantage"? No. Verdict: She
"corruptly" endeavored to influence the due administration of justice.
The Fourth Circuit also rendered a decision whose impact softened the standard of
intent required for conviction under Section 1503. In United States v. Neiswender,
198
the court determined that "[i]n our view, the defendant need only have had knowledge
or notice that success in his fraud would have likely resulted in an obstruction ofjustice.
Notice is provided by the reasonable foreseeability of the natural and probable
consequences of one's acts."' 199 The defendant in Neiswender had attempted to commit
a fraud (by claiming he could influence a juror in a pending trial against former
Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel), but had hoped to not obstruct justice.
200
Neiswender was convicted because he should have known "the natural and probable
consequences" of his acts, but he admitted his fraud was just that, a fraud.201 He had no




In United States v. De La Rosa,20 3 the court stated that an element of a conviction
under Section 1503 is "that the defendant acted corruptly with the specific intent to
influence, obstruct, or impede that proceeding in its due administration of justice."
20 4
De La Rosa does not actually define "corruptly" -the court merely concluded that by
rearranging the words of the statute a clearer explanation could be reached.
20 5
The Sixth Circuit primarily follows a general and specific intent-based definition of
corruptly. In United States v. Collis,206 the court stated the intent element of Section
1503 prosecution to be that "the defendant acted corruptly with the intent of
influencing, obstructing, or impeding the proceeding in the due administration of
justice."'207 The court rephrased: "the endeavor must have the 'natural and probable
effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice."'208 The Collis court also
held there exists a "knowledge" element to a Section 1503 prosecution.
20 9
In United States v. Mullins, the court followed a definition of "corruptly" requiring
proof of both "general intent of knowledge" and "specific intent of purpose to
obstruct." 210 United States v. Jeter211 is the case generally cited within the Sixth
objective." Id. at 619 (emphasis added). The jury's conclusion entails a finding that Littleton endeavored to
obstruct the grand jury (to convict him they must have determined she had understood her action could help
her son; her actions involved false statements).
198. 590 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1979).
199. Id. at 1273.
200. Id. at 1271.
201. Id. at 1273.
202. Id. at 1275.
203. 171 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1999).
204. Id. at 220-2 1.
205. Cf the Fifth Circuit's treatment of"corruptly" within 26 U.S.C. § 7212, supra Part V.C.
206. 128 F.3d 313 (6th Cir. 1997).
207. Id. at 318.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 22 F.3d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
211. 775 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Circuit for this proposition. 212 Jeter also demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit tends to
follow the Second Circuit with their construction of "corruptly" involving both a
general and specific intent.2 13  "Specific intent" when used in this context means
whatever the court decides it means. The actual intent of Section 1503 is "corruptly,"
while the conduct is "endeavor," and the result is "obstruct justice. '2 14 Here again, the
court defines "corruptly" as "corruptly" and moves on.215 "Prosecutors and courts can
make "specific intent to obstruct" anything they want, regardless of whether it is
actually "corrupt" or not.216
In United States v. Cueto,2 17 the Seventh Circuit noted approvingly jury
instructions that defined "corruptly" as:
to act with the purpose of obstructing justice. The United States is not required to
prove that the defendant's only or even main purpose was to obstruct the due
administration of justice. The government only has to establish that the defendant
should have reasonably seen that the natural and probable consequences of his acts
was [sic] the obstruction of justice. Intent may be inferred from all of the
surrounding facts and circumstances. Any act, by any party, whether lawful or
unlawful on its face, may violate Section 1503, if performed with a corrupt
motive.218
These instructions require conviction if a defendant should have "reasonably seen"
that his actions could obstruct justice. Prosecutions under this standard could reach
almost anyone. The court further noted that "[o]therwise lawful conduct, even acts
undertaken by an attorney in the course of representing a client, can transgress § 1503 if
employed with the corrupt intent to accomplish that which the statute forbids."
2 19
Close, but again too far away. The law should not be reduced to something on par with
horseshoes and hand-grenades. The statute reads, "Whoever . . . corruptly . . .
endeavors.., to... obstruct... justice."220 An excellent example of the inherent flaw
in these definitions of "corruptly" within Section 1503 comes from the Cueto case itself.
In Cueto, an undercover agent, ostensibly for the purposes of gathering evidence,
suggested to the owner of an illegal gambling operation that a bribe might help the
investigation go away. 221 Using the definitions accepted in Cueto itself (and arguendo,
212. Id. at 679 ("The obstruction of justice statute possesses a limited standard of culpability that confines
its coverage to constitutionally unprotected activity, which stems from its explicit mens rea requirement that a
person must "corruptly" endeavor to interfere with the due administration of justice. Thus one must impede
the due administration of justice with the general intent of knowledge as well as the specific intent of purpose
to obstruct." (citation omitted)).
213. See id. at 675 (citing United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d I I 11, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1974)).
214. See Mullins, 22 F.3d at 675.
215. See id (demonstrating the title of this Article, "The Lewis Carroll Offense").
216. See note I for explanation.
217. 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998).
218. Id. at 630-31.
219. Id. at 631.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
221. See 151 F.3d at 625 ("In an attempt to gather evidence, Robinson, who was present at the VFW raid,
indicated that Venezia could avoid further interruptions of his illegal gambling operation if he were to offer a
bribe to discourage the investigation and the interference, and he suggested to Venezia that they meet.").
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that the FBI agent knew a grand jury investigation was going on), it does not matter that
the agent's "purpose" was to gather evidence; a "natural and probable" consequence of
suggesting bribery as a method to slow an investigation is that bribery might indeed
occur. That the target might consider other bribes is foreseeable. The act of bribery
does not necessarily have to be in the manner suggested by the agent; the illegal
gambling owner might discover a more appealing target to bribe than that suggested by
the FBI agent. Seemingly, what matters in the Seventh Circuit is not actual intent, but
an imputed version of it. While the odds of a successful prosecution of an FBI agent
under the previous fact pattern are slim, the fact is that it could happen. Under the
common law definition of "corruptly," it would be inconceivable.
222
In Cueto, the defendant and amicus argued that extending Section 1503 to the
conduct of defense attorneys would have a chilling effect on representations. 223 The
court wisely noted that "[i]t is true that, to a certain extent, a lawyer's conduct
influences judicial proceedings, or at least attempts to affect the outcome of the
proceedings. However, that influence stems from a lawyer's attempt to advocate his
client's interests within the scope of the law."224 Acting within the scope of the law
necessarily means that the benefit sought is not an "unlawful" one. The definition of
"corruptly" involving an effort to secure "an unlawful benefit for one's self or another"
would present no issue in similar cases.
The Eighth Circuit follows a general/specific intent requirement for convictions
under Section 1503. In United States v. Jackson,225 the court approved a jury
instruction reading, in part:
To establish the offense charged in each count of the indictment, the government
must prove that Cleo Jackson acted corruptly and with the specific intent of
influencing Mrs. Turner and/or Mr. Greer in the discharge of their duties and to
influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. In this case, the
word "corruptly" means willfully, knowingly, and with the specific intent to
influence a juror to abrogate his or her legal duties as a petit juror.226
The court rejected the appellant's contention because the instruction did not
explicitly define "corruptly" as "improper motive or with bad or evil or wicked
222. The Seventh Circuit has approved a definition of "corruptly" involving both intent to obstruct the
proceedings and an intent to receive an unlawful benefit. See United States v. Machi, 811 F.2d 991, 996 (7th
Cir. 1987) (defining "corruptly" to mean "with 'a wrongful design to acquire some pecuniary or other
advantage' ... [and] that the act must be done with the purpose of obstructing justice") (citations omitted).
223. See Cueto, 151 F.3d at 631-32. "The Association [National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers] believes that this type of sweeping prosecution will sufficiently chill vigorous advocacy and
eventually destroy the delicate balance between prosecution and defense which is necessary to maintain the
effective operation of the criminal justice system." Id. at 632. The court's response mirrors our own. We are
not attempting to create a system where lawyers have carte blanche to act illegally under the guise of legal
representation. As the court explained, "If lawyers are not punished for their criminal conduct and corrupt
endeavors to manipulate the administration of justice, the result would be the same: the weakening of an
ethical adversarial system and the undermining ofjust administration of the law." Id.
224. Id. (emphasis in original).
225. 607 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1979).
226. Id. at 1221.
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purpose .... ,,227 Affirming its specific intent definition, the court concluded that they
were "satisfied that the issue of specific intent in the context of this case was properly
submitted to the jury and the motion for a new trial was appropriately denied."
228
B. Section 1505 and Corruptly
Section 1505229 has resulted in relatively few prosecutions in recent years, but the
few that have occurred impacted the current discourse involving "corruptly." The two
most influential cases in this area come from the Iran/Contra Affair and the
prosecutions of Oliver North and John Poindexter. 23  The result of these cases was that
"corruptly" was unconstitutionally vague in the context of Section 1505. Both cases
contained strong dissents.231  The Poindexter holding that "corruptly" was
unconstitutionally vague resulted in a change to the federal code to explicitly override
the decision.232 These two cases are illustrative of the debate that rages today.
1. United States v. North: The D.C. Circuit Commits a Lewis Carroll Offense
The story of the Iran/Contra Affair that lead to the Poindexter and North decisions
is beyond the scope of this Article. The decisions have import to the topic at hand
because both have contributed to the current understanding of "corruptly." The
decision involving Oliver North's contributions, spanning 117 pages, exemplifies the
treatment courts usually give to the term "corruptly. '2 33 Interestingly enough, in United
States v. Poindexter,234 the D.C. Circuit recited the definition it approved (but did not
use) in the North decision on the way to its determination that the term "corruptly" was
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1222.
229. The complete text of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 reads:
Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance, in whole or in part, with
any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act [15
U.S.C.S. §§ 1311 et seq.], willfully withholds, misrepresents, removes from any place, conceals,
covers up, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material,
answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony, which is the subject of such demand; or
attempts to do so or solicits another to do so; or
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication
influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper
administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department
or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which
any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any
joint committee of the Congress-
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000).
230. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
231. See North, 910 F.2d at 913 (Wald, C.J., dissenting in part, and Silberman, J., concurring dubitante in
part and dissenting in part); Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 388 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting in part).
232. See infra note 237.
233. North, 910 F.2d at 843.
234. 951 F.2d at 379.
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unconstitutionally vague and failed "to provide constitutionally adequate notice that it
prohibits lying to the Congress."'235 This strange result motivated Congress to enact a
definition of "corruptly" into 18 U.S.C. § 1515 that made clear that "corruptly" could
reach "personal" conduct as well as conduct which "influenc[es] another." 236 Courts
have later explained that the basic reason for this change was to make it clear that lying
to Congress was covered under the statute.237 In its attempt to prevent a decision like
Poindexter from happening again, Congress missed the proverbial 'forest from the
trees' and enacted an incomplete definition of "corruptly" which would render the term
meaningless in certain circumstances.
238
To understand the trouble that "corruptly" has given courts, the D.C. Circuit's
opinion in North serves as a guide. As in most of the interesting cases on this topic, a
dissenting voice examines the majority's reasoning with a clarity not found in the
controlling opinion. In North, the majority stated that "[b]ecause Congress is not shown
to have intended otherwise, 'corruptly' should be understood by a jury and by a court to
have its usual meaning. In general, common words in statutes should be given their
common or popular meanings, in the absence of congressional definition."'239  The
problem with this point of view is demonstrated when the word is a term of art, entitled
to its common law roots rather than its "common or popular" meaning. 24  The court
turned to a "standard dictionary" for a definition of "depraved, evil: perverted into a
state of moral weakness or wickedness ... of debased political morality: characterized
by bribery, the selling of political favors, or other improper political or legaltr "" . ,,241
transactions or arrangements. Usually, definitions of this sort (taken from non-legal
soil) are unhelpful--defining "corruptly" as "evil" or "perverted into a state of moral
weakness" or "other improper political or legal transactions" hardly casts an
235. Id.
236. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2000) ("As used in section 1505, the term 'corruptly' means acting with an
improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or
withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information.").
237. See United States v. Brady, 168 F.3d 574, 578 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999) ("As explained on the floor of
Congress, the provision was to make clear that lying or otherwise obstructing Congress was covered by
section 1505, and to counter any suggestion of undue vagueness made in United States v. Poindexter.")
(citations omitted)); see also 142 CONG. REC. S 11605-02, S 11607-608 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) states that "'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose ... including
making a false or misleading statement .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2000).
239. North, 910 F.2d at 881 (citations omitted).
240. In Evans v. United States, the Court stated,
It is a familiar "maxim that a statutory term is generally presumed to have its common-law
meaning." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990). As we have explained: "[W]here
Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of
centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to
each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary
direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from
them." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
504 U.S. 255, 259-60 (1992).
Finally, Evans cites Justice Frankfurter: "[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source,
whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it." Id. at 260 n.3 (citing Felix
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.L. REv. 527, 537 (1947)). But see
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (stating burglary does not keep common law soil).
241. North, 910 F.2d at 881 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 512 (1976)).
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illuminating light on the subject.242 The court offered another definition, this time from
a legal dictionary: "the intent to obtain an improper advantage for oneself or someone
else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others."'243  Searching for
definitions of legal terms within a legal dictionary provides more useful definitions, at
least in the case of "corruptly." Having mentioned the common law definition, the
court shifts gears to discuss how other appellate courts have treated 18 U.S.C. § 1503's
"corruptly" requirement.
The North court noted approvingly that other courts, in the context of Section 1503,
have defined "corruptly" as "nothing more than an intent to obstruct the proceeding."
' 244
Unfortunately, this definition creates a reading of Section 1503 that is circular; this
contention is illustrated by using the omnibus provision, "whoever [intending to
obstruct the proceeding] . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice... ,,245 The majority
distinguished the application of a "per se" presumption of "corrupt actions" within
Section 1503 from Section 1505 by concluding that the "assert[ion] that all endeavors to
influence, obstruct or impede the proceeding of congressional committees are, as a
matter of law, corrupt-would undoubtedly criminalize some innocent behavior."
246
Moreover, the court noted that "[n]o one can seriously question that people constantly
attempt, in innumerable ways, to obstruct or impede congressional committees."
247
This distinction is untenable. While the court states, "Very few non-corrupt ways to or
reasons for intentionally obstructing a judicial proceeding leap immediately to mind," at
least one method does come to mind: a witness within a judicial proceeding that
exercises his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.248  This witness intends to
obstruct or impede the judicial proceeding by remaining silent; presumably, if the
witness spoke, he might incriminate himself, hence clearing the way for a quicker
judicial proceeding. This conduct, however, is not an attempt to secure an "unlawful
benefit" but to exercise a lawful right, namely the right against self-incrimination
contained within the Fifth Amendment. 249 Under the definition of "corruptly" the
majority adopts in the Section 1503 context, this witness would fall within the reach of
Section 1503 for exercising a constitutional right. Juxtaposing this hypothetical with an
actual "corrupt" requirement, only a witness that does not have a right to remain silent
would be swept into the coverage of Section 1503. That witness would be seeking an
unlawful benefit (silence without a compelling reason in a judicial proceeding to avoid
prosecution) for himself or another.
North was challenging this area because he felt that a mistake-of-law defense
should have been presented to the jury based on the term "unlawful" within the offered
242. As the Tenth Circuit noted in Cartwright v. Maynard, "Vague terms do not suddenly become clear
when they are defined by reference to other vague terms." 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
243. North, 910 F.2d at 882 (citing BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969)).
244. Id. at 822.
245. This definition is the result of substituting the phrase "intending to obstruct the proceeding" for
"corruptly" as found in 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
246. North, 910 F.2d at 882.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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definition of "corruptly.' 250 This contention causes a major split between the majority
and the dissent. 251  Since North declared that then-President Reagan authorized his
actions, had Reagan been compelled to testify, North argues, the President's
authorization would negate the intent covered by the term "corruptly."' 252 The court
held that "a person who 'corruptly' intends to obstruct a pending investigation has the
requisite criminal intent under 18 U.S.C. § 1505. The person need not know that his
actions are unlawful in order to violate the statute."
253
Judge Silberman, who took the unusual position of both concurring dubitante and
dissenting in part, explains with clarity the analysis that must be undertaken to
understand the term "corruptly" in the Section 1505 context. Judge Silberman begins
from the seemingly obvious premise that the term "'corruptly' in Section 1505 means
something.' 254 Moreover, he noted that "'corruptly' modifies the word 'endeavor'-by
describing either the defendant's means or his motive or both-and thereby adds
something substantive to the statute." 255 Following the majority's method, the dissent
cites Webster's dictionary and a legal dictionary for definitions of "corruptly."
256
Insightfully, the dissent states, "It is hard to believe that anyone could quarrel with
[those definitions] ... but there are cases-primarily dealing with Section 1503-which
interpret 'corruptly' to refer to the defendant's motive but then inconsistently say that
the bad or evil motive denoted ... means nothing more than an intent to obstruct the
proceeding." 257  The dissent's commentary on these cases bears repetition: "If the
statute says that it is a crime if one 'corruptly endeavors to obstruct [an inquiry or
proceeding]' it simply makes no sense to construe that to mean only that one must do it
with the intent to obstruct the inquiry or proceeding. ' 258  The value of this insight
should not be downplayed; the dissent cited opinions from the Sixth Circuit, 259 Ninth
Circuit, 2 6 Tenth Circuit,2 6 1 and arguably the Fourth Circuit 26 2 that define "corruptly"
in such a manner. It is tough to argue with the dissent's point that "the word 'endeavor'
250. North, 910 F.2d at 889.
251. The dissent challenges the majority's disposition of the term "corruptly," but as a means to its
ultimate end. The gist of the dissent's view on this matter is that the purpose and means of the defendant are
important. See id. at 943-44.
252. See id. This analysis is substantively correct, but technically North was charged as an aider and
abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2 for the actions of Poindexter and Casey. If their actions were not "corrupt," then
North could not be convicted for aiding and abetting a "non-corrupt" obstruction of a proceeding.
253. Id. at 889.
254. North, 910 F.2d at 940 (Silberman, J., concurring dubitante in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
in original).
255. Id.
256. Id. ("According to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 'corruptly' is the
adverbial form of the adjective 'corrupt,' meaning 'depraved, evil'.... Also instructive is the definition in
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 311 (5th ed. 1979) that the word corruptly 'when used in a statute... generally
imports a wrongful design to acquire some pecuniary or other advantage.').
257. Id.
258. Id. at 941.
259. United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1985).
260. United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1988).
261. United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979).
262. United States v. Mitchell, 877 F.2d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 1989).
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in the statute already requires that the defendant intend to obstruct the inquiry or
proceeding."
263
Resorting again to strict statutory construction, the dissent buttresses its point by
"focusing on the term 'influence' in Section 1505, which appears in a parallel
construction with 'obstruct' and 'impede."'' 264 Noting that it is "possible to be charged
with 'corruptly endeavoring to influence' a congressional inquiry," the dissent
concludes that the statement "must require something more than merely acting with the
purpose of influencing the congressional committee." 26 5 If the charge meant that one
only had to endeavor to influence the committee, the dissent wisely concluded that "we
might as well convert all of Washington's office buildings into prisons." 266 The dissent
finally discusses nuances of what it means to "corruptly" endeavor, including whether
the term reflects a purpose, means, or perhaps both.
267
2. The Poindexter Case: The D.C. Circuit Pushes "Corruptly" Off the Wall
In United States v. Poindexter,268 the majority held that the term "corruptly" was
"too vague to provide constitutionally adequate notice that it prohibits lying to the
Congress. ' 269 John Poindexter was convicted of, inter alia, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1505
for "corruptly obstruct[ing] the Congress's inquiry." 2 70 The court strangely determined
that "'corruptly influencing' a congressional inquiry does not at all clearly encompass
11271lying to the Congress. ... The majority engaged in a discussion of "transitive" and
"intransitive" forms of the word "corruptly," eventually concluding that the only
possible interpretation of "corruptly" (one that disallows a person individually to
obstruct a proceeding) within Section 1505 would not be enough to reach Poindexter's
conduct.272 The interpretation the majority offers makes little sense; it is easy enough
to say that a person, by choosing to lie to Congress, corrupts himself. The majority
seemingly does not believe that a person may do such a thing. The dissenting opinion,
263. North, 910 F.2d at 941.
264. Id. at 942.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. This section of the dissent would constitute an advanced class in statutory interpretation, but is
beyond the scope of this Article. Since this Article is attempting to solidify a consistent definition among
courts and statutes, discussing whether a defendant must have a "corrupt" purpose, means, or both would be
over-enthusiastic. For Judge Silberman's discussion, see North, 910 F.2d at 942-45.
268. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
269. Id. at 379.
270. Id. at 372. The specific acts covered by this count included, "making false statements . . .
participating in the preparation of a false chronology, and deleting from his computer information regarding
the arms shipment." Id.
271. Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 378.
272. Id. at 379. The majority notes:
Narrowing the transitive interpretation to include only 'corrupting' another person by influencing
him to violate his legal duty would both take account of the context in which the term 'corruptly'
appears and avoid the vagueness inherent in words like 'immorally.' But that interpretation, which
for convenience we shall refer to as the 'subornation' interpretation of the statute, would not cover
the conduct of Poindexter at issue on this appeal.
2004]
Journal of Legislation
citing the definition of "corruptly" the North majority mentioned, was dismissed in a
curt footnote stating:
Our dissenting colleague suggests that as he would redefine the vague term
corruptly-"i.e. acting in a manner inconsistent with a legal duty"--it is sufficiently
clear to pass constitutional muster. The question before the court is not, however,
whether we can now rewrite the statute to make it clear, but whether the defendant
was fairly on notice of its meaning when he acted.
273
To construe merely offering a definition of a statutory term as "rewrit[ing] the statute,"
the majority concludes that defining terms of art is not the province of courts.
The dissent uses far less space in the federal reporter refuting the majority's take on
"corruptly." The dissent defines "corruptly" as "acting in a manner inconsistent with a
legal duty.''274  Simply reciting the fact that "Poindexter lied to Congress about the
existence of the first Presidential finding and then later destroyed it" allowed the dissent
to easily conclude that "[t]his was a clear violation of his oath of office, his oath to
Congress, and his duty not to lie."
' 275 In an excellent example of elemental analysis,
276
the dissent makes clear the different possible charges under Section 1505, and rightly
concludes that Congress could not have "meant to prohibit attempts to obstruct justice
by influencing someone else to violate a legal duty, but did not mean to prohibit
attempts to obstruct justice by violating one's own legal duty."' 2 77  The phrase
"inconsistent with a legal duty" is not inconsistent with the "unlawful/improper
advantage or benefit" language advocated by this Article; the presence of a legal duty
implies a certain level of conduct. If that conduct is intentionally not followed
(violation of an oath, for instance), the act of violating the duty is an attempt to receive
an unlawful advantage or benefit by acting in opposition to the expectation society has
of that conduct. Poindexter easily violated the definition both supported by common
law and advocated by this Article.
As a result of this opinion, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1515, part (b) of which
reads, "As used in Section 1505, the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper
purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading
statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other
information." 278 Congress, in an effort to counteract the Poindexter holding, enacted an
incomplete definition of "corruptly." Both the North majority, and the dissent in
Poindexter, concluded that "corruptly" should mean "the intent to obtain an improper
273. Id. at 380 n. 1 (citations omitted).
274. Id. at 391 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting in part).
275. Id.
276. Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 391. ("A person can violate section 1505 by corruptly (i.e. acting in a
manner inconsistent with a legal duty) obstructing, influencing, or impeding a congressional inquiry; a person
can violate the statute by using threats in a manner that obstructs, influences, or impedes a congressional
inquiry; and a person can violate the statute by using force to obstruct, influence, or impede a congressional
inquiry. None of these uses is inconsistent with the statute and none involves a defendant influencing another
person to violate his legal duty in a manner that obstructs a congressional inquiry.").
277. Id.
278. 18 U.S.C. § 1515 (2000). See False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-292, 110 Stat
3459 (redesignated § 1515(b) as § 1515(c); and added a new § 1515(b)).
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advantage for oneself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of
others." 279 Congress, however, missed the chance to fully correct the problems caused
by the misunderstanding of "corruptly."
C. Section 1512(b) and Corruptly
The perspective of the federal courts on the meaning of the phrase "corruptly
persuades" within 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) 28 is amply shown by two decisions. In 1996,
the Second Circuit held in United States v. Thompson that the meaning of "corruptly"
within section 1512(b) is analogous to Section 1503 and means "with an improper
purpose."'28 1  In the 1997 decision United States v. Farrell,2 82 the Third Circuit
determined that "corruptly" in Section 1503 is different than "corruptly" in Section
1512(b), but hesitated to provide an abstract meaning of the term.283 "Corruptly," they
wrote, in the context of Section 1503 means an act done "with improper motive. ' 284 In
regard to Section 1512's "corruptly persuades" language, the Farrell majority observed
that, "the inclusion of 'corruptly' in section 1512(b) [necessarily implies] that an
individual can 'persuade' another not to disclose information to a law enforcement
official with the intent ofhindering an investigation without violating the statute, i.e.,
279. See North, 910 F.2d at 881-82; Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 391 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting in part).
280. The full text of 1512(b) is:
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens or corruptly persuades another person, or
attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to--
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(2) cause or induce any person to-
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an
official proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding;
(C) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a
record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been summoned by
legal process; or
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the
United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal
offense or a violation of conditions of probation supervised release, parole, or release
pending judicial proceedings;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000).
281. 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996).
282. 126 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1997).
283. Id. at 490. ("[Wle do not find the use of 'corruptly' in § 1503 sufficiently analogous to its use in §
1512(b)'s "corruptly persuades" clause to justify construing the terms identically.") This brings up an
interesting split among the circuits, as Senior Circuit Judge Campbell pointed out in his dissent in Farrell:
"Given this background [legislative history], it is logical to attribute to the 'corruptly persuade' language in §
1512, as adopted by Congress in 1988, the same well-established meaning already attributed by the courts to
the comparable language in § 1503, i.e. 'motivated by an improper purpose."' Id. at 492 (Campbell, J.,
dissenting). As Judge Kearse pointed out in United States v. Thompson, "Section 1512(b) does not prohibit
all persuasion but only that which is 'corrupt[].' The inclusion of the qualifying term 'corrupt[]' means that
the government must prove that the defendant's attempts to persuade were motivated by an improper
purpose." 76 F.3d 442,452 (2d Cir. 1996).
284. See Farrell, 126 F.3d at 490 ("This interpretation of "corruptly" in § 1503 [as the intent element
meaning 'with an improper purpose'] is entirely appropriate given the structure of that statute.").
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without doing so 'corruptly."'' 285  Farrell held that "corruptly persuades" does not
"include a noncoercive attempt to persuade a coconspirator who enjoys a Fifth
Amendment right not to disclose self-incriminating information about the conspiracy to
refrain.., from volunteering information to investigators.'"286  The court noted that
Section 1515(c) removes "lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in connection
with or anticipation of an official proceeding" from the reach of the entire obstruction of
justice section, including 1512(b). 287 Moreover, the court stated that "we do not think
the attorney-client situation constitutes the only type of noncoercive persuasion to
withhold information that falls outside the purview of § 1512(b)(3)." 288 The court's
conclusion is that members of a conspiracy may persuade one another not to testify
against the conspiracy, so long as they do not do so corruptly. 289 Using the common
law definition of "corruptly"-"with the purpose to secure an unlawful benefit for
oneself or another"-Farrell was guilty because he attempted to secure a benefit he was
not entitled to (another person's silence) in order to "hinder, delay, or prevent the
communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of
information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense."
' 290
D. Let the Jury Decide: Cases When "Corruptly" Does Matter
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Brenson,29 1 rejected a claim that
"corruptly" was unconstitutionally vague within Section 1503. The manner in which
they did so created a split within the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Circuit.292  In
Brenson, a member of a sitting grand jury (i.e. Brenson) described the contents of the
proceedings to a person he knew to be an associate of the target of the proceeding.
293
Brenson disclosed the contents of the grand jury in "an attempt to get a date with [the
target of the investigation's] daughter."'294  He was convicted of both conspiracy to
obstruct justice and obstruction of justice.295 On appeal, Brenson contended that the
285. Id. at 489.
286. Id. at 488.
287. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. 1515(c) (2000)).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 489.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (2000).
291. 104 F.3d 1267 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
292. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Barfield, held that "corruptly" had nothing to
do with personal gain (i.e. seeking an improper advantage). 999 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11 th Cir. 1993). The court
wrote:
The district court concluded that Barfield did not act corruptly in large part because the
government never showed that Barfield stood to gain personally from the obstruction. According
to Eleventh Circuit precedent, this is not the appropriate standard with which to evaluate the
'corruptly' requirement. As previously discussed, 'the government must show that the defendant
knowingly and intentionally undertook an action from which an obstruction of justice was a
reasonably foreseeable result.
Id. (citations omitted). Barfield illustrates the Eleventh Circuit reading "corruptly" out of the statute by
making it mean "endeavor." But see United States v. Banks, 942 F.2d 1576, 1579 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (holding
that "legitimate and well-founded fear for his own safety and that of members of his family" as a reason for
refusing to testify in front a grand jury is not "corrupt[ ].").
293. Brenson, 104 F.3dat 1273.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1274.
[Vol. 3 1:1
The Lewis Carroll Offense
term "corruptly" was unconstitutionally vague.296 The Eleventh Circuit panel denied
his challenge and cited approvingly a case defining "corruptly" in the context of 26
297U.S.C. § 7212(a). The Eleventh Circuit used a decision involving 26 U.S.C. §
7212(a) in defining "corruptly" as "forbidding those acts done with the intent to secure
an unlawful benefit either for oneself or for another" to overcome a vagueness
challenge to "corruptly" in Section 1503.298 This extension of 7212(a) has passed
largely unnoticed, as the jury instruction approved in Brenson stated that:
Corruptly describes the specific intent of the crime. Generally, the government must
show that the defendant ... knowingly and intentionally [undertook] an action from
which an obstruction of justice was a reasonably foreseeable result.
Although the government is not required to prove that the defendant ...had the
specific purpose of obstruction of justice, it must, the government, must establish that
the conduct was prompted at least in part by the corrupt motive.
299
This instruction is not as clear as the definition of "corruptly" used to overcome the
vagueness challenge. It seems reasonable that if the Brenson court can claim that the
definition of "corruptly" used within another statute makes the present statute clear (or
at least not unconstitutionally vague), it has implicitly approved the definition for use in
that context.
In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly acknowledged the definition this Article
proposes for "corruptly." 300 The Eleventh Circuit considered:
whether a person who, in refusing to give testimony before a grand jury, is motivated
solely by legitimate and well-founded fear for his own safety and that of members of
his family, can be said to have 'corruptly' endeavored to impede the due
administration of justice.
301
In Banks, an inmate (Banks) was called as a witness in a federal grand jury to
testify about a former acquaintance suspected of being the "leader of a large-scale drug
organization."'302 Banks refused to testify "on the stated ground that to do so would
endanger his own life and the lives of members of his family." 30 3 The Eleventh Circuit
held:
[A] defendant charged with obstructing of justice for refusing to testify may, within a
narrow range of unusual and extreme circumstances, be entitled to acquittal upon
296. Id. at 1280.
297. Id. at 1281.
298. Id. (citing United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991)).
299. Brenson, 104 F.2d at 1279.
300. United States v. Banks, 942 F.2d 1576, 1579 (11 th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging "corruptly" as "an
intent to receive an unlawful benefit/advantage for oneself or another").
301. Id.




proof that his refusal was based solely upon a realistic and reasonable perception that
giving testimony would result in imminent harm to the safety of the witness or
members of his family.
304
The key question that remained was "whether these issues were properly submitted to
the jury."
30 5
The remaining portion of the Banks decision illustrates where courts have generally
gone astray. The relevant part of the jury instructions in the Banks case read:
To endeavor to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice means to take
some action for the purpose of interfering with or preventing the enforcement of the
law of the land sought to be brought before the court. However, it is not necessary for
the government to prove the grand jury was, in fact, prevented in any way from its
role in the enforcement of the law, only that the defendant corruptly attempted to do
so....
To act corruptly means to act knowingly and dishonestly with a specific intent to
subvert or undermine the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings.
306
The court stated that "each of these statements is a correct statement of the law,
[although] upon careful review of the charge as a whole, we are left with the firm
impression that the charge was inadequate to permit the jury to give proper
consideration to defendant's proffered defense to the charge. '3° 7 The court concluded
that the instructions were a correct statement of the current law and that they were
inadequate. Part of this paradoxical result is that the Banks court believed that the
instant case contained a "narrow range of unusual and extreme circumstances." 30 8 The
court noted that Banks was "in a vulnerable position, since he was serving time in
prison; that [he] was aware of instances in which 'snitches' had been murdered in that
same prison. . . , [his] life had been directly threatened ...and the home of a close
family member was sprayed with machinegun fire."309 The Banks decision illustrates
the realization of the Eleventh Circuit that "corruptly" must have some meaning. Banks
was cited in the Eleventh Circuit case United States v. Pielago for the proposition that it
is "plain error where jury instruction was inadequate to permit the jury to give proper
consideration to the proffered defense. ' 3 1° Banks, alas, has not been widely noted in
federal circuits and largely ignored by the Eleventh Circuit.
311
304. Id. at 1579.
305. Id.
306. Banks, 942 F.2dat 1580.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1579.
309. Id.
310. 135 F.3d 703, 722 (1 th Cir. 1998) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Banks, 942 F.2d
1576, 1579-81 (Ilth Cir. 1991)).
311. In fact, Pielago is the only Eleventh Circuit case to cite it.
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VII. "CORRUPTLY" WITHIN THE FEDERAL BRIBERY STATUTE, 18 U.S.C. § 201
There are few decisions where a federal court of appeals, in the context of bribery,
recites the definition proposed by this Article. The times it does occur happen usually
within the context of a state bribery statute brought up on appeal. For instance, in the
case Agan v. Vaughn,3 12 the Eleventh Circuit in the context of a Georgia bribery statute
had no qualms about referencing Black's Law Dictionary to define "corruptly" as
"importing a wrongful design to acquire some pecuniary or other advantage." 313 The
Agan court also noted several other state decisions applying the same definition.3 14 The
federal appellate courts do not seem to reject this Article's proposed language when it is
presented to them; the problem is that the appellate courts can only review what they
receive. As the following section shows, they are not receiving under 18 U.S.C. § 201
the same definition used in 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).
3 15
A. What "People of Common Intelligence" Understand
While the position of this Article is that the federal circuits are in some disarray due
to the lack of a dynamic definition of "corruptly," order exists in rare pockets
throughout the federal reporters. In 1974, the Tenth Circuit decided the case United
States v. Pommerening.3 16  The appellant challenged several terms in 18 U.S.C. §
201(b) as unconstitutionally vague.3 17 The court, in addressing this contention, stated
that "[c]learly a person of common intelligence would understand from reading §
201(b) that giving compensation to a government official in exchange for preferential
treatment is not allowed." 318 Moreover, the court explained that "[t]he ordinary person
would therefore understand that giving a $5,000 automobile to a government official, in
exchange for that official's influence in expediting a loan application, constitutes
corruptly giving of something of value to influence an official act." 3 19 This case fits
nicely into the set of facts that everyone would define as "corrupt," but the illustration
demonstrates that many judges "know" the meaning of "corrupt," even if there are times
when they just will not write.
The First Circuit, in the case Roma Construction Company v. aRusso,
320
encountered a case that required "corruptly" to have effect. In aRusso, the Roma
Construction Company and an individual named Peter Zanni entered into a pre-existing
development deal with two individuals in the town of Johnston, Rhode Island. 32 1 Zanni
312. 119 F.3d 1538 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
313. Id. at 1543 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 345 (6th ed. 1990)).
314. Agan, 119 F.3d at 1543 (citing cases from Arizona, California, and North Carolina that defined
"corruptly" as "a wrongful design to acquire [some advantage]"). Agan also cites the Ninth Circuit opinion in
United States v. Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1995), that takes notice of California's statutory
definition for "corruptly" as "a wrongful design to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage to the
person guilty of the act or omission referred to, or to some other person." Id.
315. The definition used in the context of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) prosecutions is discussed supra at Part IV.
316. 500 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1974).
317. Id. at 97.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. 96 F.3d 566 (1st Cir. 1996).
321. Id. at 568.
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and Roma were unaware that their partners had "entered into an arrangement with the
de facto government of the town, with aRusso [the mayor] as 'the Boss,' under which
payments would be made to this enterprise in order to obtain necessary approvals."
322
Eventually, Roma and Zenni bought out their partners and learned of this preexisting
deal. 323 Zenni was told that "his project was 'dead' if he did not make payments."
324
Because Zenni had "invested heavily in the project, and reasonably believ[ed] that he
was dealing with a racketeering enterprise that had extorted and stolen for years during
its control of the town, [he] paid up." 325 Until he sold his share three years later, Zenni
continued making payments to this "de facto government . . . in order to obtain the
necessary approvals." '326 Zenni then went to the FBI and later, with Roma, sued a host
of people and entities for state and federal RICO violations. 327 The appellate decision
is a result of the district court's dismissal of the suit because "[t]he plaintiffs here are
neither innocent nor victims."'328 In determining whether there is an "innocent victim"
requirement in RICO, the First Circuit grasped the elusive meaning of "corruptly."
The district court cited the Model Penal Code commentary as support for their
denial of the plaintiff's defense of extortion as "correct as a matter of policy. ' 329 The
district court also advanced other policy concerns, observing that:
Allowing wrongdoers . . . to recover treble damages under RICO would subvert the
twofold purpose of that act, to eliminate the economic incentives driving organized
crime and to compensate the innocent victim. Such a result would provide no
incentive for those approached by public officials for illegal payments to report such
activity to law enforcement. Persons... could engage in bribery of public officials
with full knowledge that if the bribery scheme (viewed as an effort to expedite
official approval) broke down for whatever reason, they could seek a treble return on
their illicit, but failed, investment, from those with whom they once illegally dealt. It
would be a no loss situation for criminal activity.
330
Both of these arguments have merit in a vacuum. Moreover, both make sound
policy observations in the context of statutes with a similar structure to the Model Penal





326. aRusso, 96 F.3d at 568.
327. Id.
328. Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 906 F.Supp. 78, 82 (D.R.I. 1995), rev'd, 96 F.3d 566 (1st Cir. 1996).
329. Id. at 81. The M.P.C. Commentary states:
The private citizen who responds to an official's threat of adverse action by paying money to
secure more favorable treatment evidences thereby a willingness to subvert the legitimate
processes of government. It is not acceptable to pay . . . under-the-table compensation to a public
servant, even if such payment is required in order to obtain official action rightfully due. Such
conduct constitutes a degree of cooperation in the undermining of governmental integrity that is
inconsistent with the complete exoneration from criminal liability.
Id. at 81-82 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1, commentary at 41 (1980)).
330. See aRusso, 906 F.Supp. at 83.
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they fail to take into account the text of the Rhode Island bribery statute. 33 1 Further, the
Model Penal Code explicitly states it does not follow Rhode Island law, so any analogy
between the two concepts of bribery seems immediately suspect. 332 Moreover, the First
Circuit observed that "the Model Penal Code's provision contains no requirement that a
payor act 'corruptly.' 333 The comparison between the Model Penal Code's exclusion
of the term "corruptly" 334 and inclusion of "corruptly" within a statute illustrates the
meaning "corruptly" must necessarily possess. The First Circuit agreed with the
plaintiffs' argument that the "Model Penal Code's omission of the term 'corruptly' is no
mere semantic distinction; rather, it represents a shift from the common law in
expanding the scope of bribery sanctions for payors to situations in which the payor
does not act corruptly. ' 335 The court concluded that "[t]he term 'corruptly' adds the
element of corrupt intent to the crime of bribery." 336  In casting "corruptly" in a
different manner than the American Law Institute, the First Circuit observed that "[t]he
mens rea implicated by 'corruptly' concerns the intention to obtain ill-gotten gain; by
contrast, the Model Penal Code converts the lack of willpower to stand up to abusive
authority into a degree of culpability. ' 337  The intent to "obtain ill-gotten gain"
represents exactly the same conduct that an intent to "obtain an unlawful advantage"
does.
The case United States v. Dorri,338 though largely decided upon standard of review
issues, contains an excellent analysis of the purpose of the term "corruptly" in the
federal bribery statute. In Dorri, the defendant, an employee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, attempted to solicit money from resident aliens in exchange for
green cards.339 After an FBI wiretap disclosed this endeavor, Dorri was indicted and
convicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A). 34  Dorri maintained both to the
FBI before trial, and during his testimony at trial, that "he had been conducting his own
personal investigation ... to prove that [the subject of his investigation] had submitted a
fraudulent application and would bribe him."34 1 He testified at length during the trial
about this "secret, unauthorized investigation. .. [and] that he had no intent to keep the
money that he had requested. ,342 The issue on appeal was whether the trial judge
should have offered a clarification of "corruptly" once the jury had requested it.343 The
majority, citing the timing and content of defense objections, determined that the
331. See aRusso, 96 F.3d at 573.
332. Id. (citing 11 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 6, n.2 (1980)).
333. Id. ("Compare R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-7-4 ('[n]o person shall corruptly give') (emphasis added) with
Model Penal Code § 240.1 ("[a] person is guilty of bribery.., if he offers, confers, or agrees to confer upon
another").").
334. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1, Comment 5 (1962) ("[U]se of the general term "corruptly" should
be abandoned and the issues addressed more particularly.").
335. aRusso, 96 F.3d at 573.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
338. 15 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 1994).
339. Id. at 889-90.
340. Id. Dorri was charged with "corruptly... seeking.., anything of value ... in return for.., being
influenced in the performance of any official act." 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A).





applicable standard of review was "plain error." 3 44  This effectively ended the
defendant's day in court. There was a dissenting voice that eloquently 345 explained
both the theory and practice that should underpin the term "corruptly."
The dissent began its exposition on "corruptly" by summarizing the defendant's
defense: "[t]he heart of [the] defense was that he wasn't acting corruptly. He was,
rather, conducting a one-man sting: He would lure [the target] into paying a bribe in
order to trap her employer." 346 While noting that the defense was both "far-fetched"
and "goofy," the dissent stated that "if believed by the jury [was] surely not illegal."
347
The reason that the conduct embodied in the defense would not be illegal is what makes
this dissent so illuminating.
After dealing with the standard of review issues, the dissent turned to "corruptly"
itself. The dissent observed that "like 'due process,' 'malice aforethought' or
'proximate cause,' [corruptly] is a concept that can't be easily captured in a single
formula, as it varies too much from situation to situation." 348 Rather than give up on
the concept, the dissent explained that "[t]here's certainly a core meaning to it
(corruptly): Conduct is corrupt if it's an improper way for a public official to benefit
from his job." 34 9  Thus, the issue in effect becomes what "improper" means. The
dissent answered this question as well, noting that "what's improper turns on many
different factors, such as tradition, context and current attitudes about legitimate
rewards for particular office holders." 350 The only issue this Article has with the
dissent is its treatment of the definition "intent to secure an unlawful benefit for oneself
or another." The dissent dismisses this definition with the question, "What benefits are
unlawful?" 35 1 Without being obvious, an unlawful benefit is one that is against the law.
Whether federal law or common law, the term "unlawful" points to a defined area of
conduct. The dissent discounts "improper" and "wrongful," citing the same question of
definitional difficulty.352 There, the footing is more sure. The terms "improper" and
"wrongful" are not limited to a defined area; both terms encompass more than simply
illegal or unlawful acts. Morals, ethics, and community values fit well into the terms
"improper" or "wrongful." Those areas are not well-suited for criminal prosecutions
without careful delineation, for as quickly as morals and community values change, so
too would the law.
3 53
The opinion offers an example of this distinction: "[a] judge, for instance,
wouldn't be acting corruptly if he conditioned a shorter prison sentence on payment of
restitution to the victim; but he would if he conditioned the lower sentence on
344. Id. at 891.
345. The majority cast his dissent in such terms, "We have no quarrel with the dissent's very eloquent
explanation of the law of bribery." Id. at 892.
346. Id. at 892 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
347. Dorri, 15 F.3d at 892.





353. As Judge Kozinski noted, there might be circumstances when a court would "find[] itself defining
'corruptly' in a way that can't fairly be applied retroactively, the Due Process Clause might bar the court from
applying the statute to the defendant before it." Dorri, 15 F.3d at 895 n.6.
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defendant's cutting the judge's lawn." 354  This distinction illustrates the difference
between an "unlawful" or "improper" advantage and one that is not "corrupt." In the
first scenario, the judge is offering something within his power to offer: a shorter
sentence, in exchange for something the other party can lawfully agree to do (perform
restitution). There is nothing improper about this conduct. In the second scenario, a
judge is not permitted to sentence people to assist him in gardening. A judge that traded
jail time for lawn care would be seeking an improper advantage, as it is not within the
scope of a judge's power to sentence offenders to his yard. The dissent surveys several
different definitions of "corruptly" while noting that "[a]ttempts to cabin the definition
of 'corruptly' within a single rule have proven unsatisfactory." 355 The issue with its
survey of definitions for "corruptly," the dissent concludes, is that each requires
additional information before becoming complete. 356  That viewpoint is not
problematic, the dissent concludes, but requires the district court to "tailor[] its
instruction to the facts and circumstances of this case, and clearly explain[] to the jury
what, under these circumstances, would be a corrupt motive and what would be a proper
one." 357 The dissent's analysis points out that the federal pattern jury instruction used
in this case 358 is incapable of serving this purpose and hence is an improper jury
instruction. 359 Though this explanation comes in the form of a dissent, the majority
opinion did not quibble with the substance at all. 360 Dissenting opinions are no less
reasonable than those of the majority; they merely have fewer votes.
B. A Lewis Carroll Offense in the Second Circuit: "Corruptly" Has Two
Meanings
The Second Circuit decision United States v. Alfisi 361 illustrates the problem with
circular definitions. In Alfisi, a produce wholesaler was convicted of bribery, paying
unlawful gratuities, and conspiracy to commit bribery for his dealings with a USDA
produce inspector. 362  Alfisi requested a jury instruction defining "corruptly" as the
"specific intent to secure an unlawful advantage or benefit.' '363  This definition of
"corruptly" has been accepted in other circuits 364 and accepted by the Second Circuit
itself within the context of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (corruptly endeavoring to obstructthe
354. Id. Other examples included logrolling, management incentives, war decorations, and rewarding
whistleblowers. Id.
355. Id.
356. E.g., The dissent cited "corruptly" as "an intent to obtain an improper advantage for oneself or
someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." Id. (citation omitted). Analyzing this
definition, the dissent observed that "whether the intended advantage is improper and whether the conduct is
inconsistent with official duty are the very questions we [the court] should be answering." Id.
357. Dorri, 15 F.3d at 895.
358. The instruction read: "An act is 'corruptly' done if it is done voluntarily and intentionally to bring
about either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful method with a hope or expectation of
either financial gain or other benefit to one's self or to another." Id. at 890 (citing 2 EDWARD J. DEVITT &
CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 25.06 (4th ed. 1990)).
359. Dorri, 15 F.3d at 895 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 892 ("We have no quarrel with the dissent's very eloquent explanation of the law of bribery.").
361. 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002).
362. Id. at 148.
363. Id. at 155 (Sack, J., dissenting).
364. See supra note 92.
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administration of IRS regulations). 365 The trial court rejected Alfisi's proposed jury
instruction regarding the term "corruptly," deciding instead that the term "corruptly"
within the bribery statute only requires "'specific intent to influence ... official acts...
,,,366 Judge Sack, writing in dissent, wryly pointed out that the majority's conception
of "corruptly" merely "instructed the jury that Alfisi committed bribery if he 'directly or
indirectly, with specific intent to influence official acts [the court's definition of
"corruptly"], [gave], offer[ed] or promise[d] [some]thing of value to [a] public official
with intent to influence any official act."' 367 As Judge Sack acknowledged, the majority
has effectively "[read] 'corruptly' out of the statute."
3 68
Bribery follows obstruction of justice with the confusion among jurists as to the
meaning of "corruptly." Some cases within the Section 201 sphere do begin to
approach the correct meaning of corruptly, but others miss the 'forest from the trees'
and have played semantic statutory interpretation games to avoid results that a correct
definition of "corruptly" would certainly avoid. A classic case on this point is United
States v. Singleton.369 In Singleton, a defendant attempted to claim that an assistant
United States Attorney (AUSA), by reaching a plea agreement in exchange for the
testimony of another defendant, violated the bribery provision of the federal code. The
majority opinion, in an interesting maneuver, held that "whoever" does not include an
AUSA because, while acting as a prosecutor for the government, the AUSA is the
government and since the United States is not a being, but an entity, Section 201 would
only apply if the statute read "whatever." 370 A concurrence in Singleton noted that
while it agreed the AUSA did not violate section 201 by offering a plea bargain in
exchange for testimony, it did not agree that "whoever" did not include the United
States government. 37 1 Judge Lucero stated in his concurrence,
I write separately to state my disagreement with the majority's holding that the word
"whoever" in 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), as it is used to define the class of persons who
can violate the statute, cannot include the government or its agents. The majority's
interpretation would permit the conclusion that consistent with the provisions of §
201, a United States Attorney may pay a prosecution witness for false testimony.
3 7 2
While the dissent in Singleton makes an effort to remove plea-bargaining for
testimony from the government's available means to prosecute, a controversial matter to
365. See United States v. Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The district court instructed the
jury that[, ']To act corruptly is to act with the intent to secure an unlawful advantage or benefit either for one's
self or for another.['] This is a well-accepted definition of the term 'corruptly' when used in this context.").
Moreover, the Kelly court draws support from § 1503 and Black's Law Dictionary while defining "corruptly."
Id.
366. See Alfisi, 308 F.3d at 156 (citations omitted).
367. Id. (emphasis in original).
368. Id.
369. 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
370. See id. at 1300 ("The United States is an inanimate entity, not a being. The word 'whatever' is used
commonly to refer to an inanimate object. See id. at 2600 (defining 'whatever' as 'anything that: everything
that') (emphasis added). Therefore, construing 'whoever' to include the government is semantically
anomalous.").
371. Id. at 1303 (Lucero, J., concurring).
372. Id.
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be sure, the majority's construction is ably demonstrated to be incorrect.373 Judge Kelly
noted that there are many inanimate beings captured by the term "whoever" by
referencing the Dictionary Act.3 7 4 While the debate between the majority, concurrence,
and dissent is quite interesting, it would be quite unnecessary under a meaningful
definition of "corruptly." Approaching this question via the common law definition of
"corruptly," the court should have asked, "What are the duties of a government
prosecutor?" 375 Having determined that the federal code both expressly and implicitly
grants the viability of making deals with witnesses in exchange for testimony, 376 the
court has only to ask whether what the AUSA did violated a duty. As the federal code
explicitly allows government attorneys to negotiate a deal in exchange for testimony,
the action involved cannot be "corrupt." The AUSA did not seek an unlawful benefit
for himself or another. Without this element of the Section 201 charge satisfied, the
defendant's case has no merit worthy of an appellate decision. Alas, that
straightforward application of the meaning of the term "corruptly" was missing from
this case; hence we received three wildly entertaining opinions on whether a
government prosecutor is an inanimate object when prosecuting for the government.
Regardless of what outcome the court arrived at in Singleton, the stunning fact is
that apparently neither the majority, dissent, concurrence, nor the Government read the
federal bribery statute in its entirety. The AUSA was charged under 18 U.S.C. §
377201(c)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) states that, "paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c)
shall not be construed to prohibit the payment or receipt of witness fees provided by
law.. . ." 378 It seems like an easier road to follow is to construe a plea-bargain as a
"witness fee" rather than undergo the gymnastics involved with defining an AUSA as
not part of the term "whoever."
' 379
VIII. PUTTING HUMPTY DUMPTY BACK TOGETHER AGAIN: HARMONIZING THE
DEFINITIONS OF "CORRUPTLY"
The various federal criminal statutes that use the term "corruptly" cover a spectrum
of prohibited conduct. The only definition currently employed by the federal circuits
that fits each scenario in a meaningful way is that used in the context of Section
7212(a). A short review of the possible alternatives demonstrates this point. As Judge
Silberman wrote in United States v. North,380 a basic premise is that "the word
373. Id. at 1310 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
374. Id. The Dictionary Act is 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) and defines "whoever" to "include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals ......
375. This is a question the court actually answered by citing several federal provisions explicitly and
implicitly dealing with the treatment of those whose testimony the government requires to make its case. See
Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1306.
376. Id. at 1303 (Lucero, J., concurring).
377. Id. at 1298.
378. 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000).
379. "Whoever" is defined by the Dictionary Act to "include corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals .. " 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Singleton
seems to mean that "individual" does not mean an Assistant United States Attorney.
380. 910 F.2d 843 (1990).
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'endeavor' in the statute already requires that the defendant intend to obstruct the
inquiry or proceeding [within the context of Section 1505]. "381 To demonstrate the
inherent flaws in the common definitions of "corruptly" found within federal
jurisprudence, a simple example will suffice. Some of the statutes that contain
"corruptly" proscribe "corrupt[] endeavors. ' 382 As a first premise, there must be a
difference between an "endeavor" and a "corrupt endeavor." An endeavor done
corruptly must mean something more than a mere endeavor. If that proposition is
accepted, it leaves the question of what does "corruptly" mean if not "endeavor"?
Removing the phrase from a statutory mooring for the purpose of this inquiry allows for
a clearer perspective. Examining the more popular suggestions, assume, arguendo, that
"corruptly" means "with improper purpose." Under that definition, "to corruptly
endeavor" means "to intend an act (i.e. endeavor) with an improper purpose." This
substitution narrows the scope of "endeavor" to "endeavors done with an improper
purpose." While this definition does advance an understanding of "corruptly," it does
not tailor the term "purpose" in such a way as to mean anything more than to "intend an
act with improper intent." The presence of "intent" twice puts the burden on the word
"act" to explain what is intended. This is demonstrated by a brief move back to a
statutory context.
In both sections 201(b)(1)(B) and 201(b)(1)(C), the conduct proscribed within is
already improper. An attempt to convince a public official to commit a fraud against
the United States 383 or to act in violation of their official duty384 is already improper
(unless part of a sanctioned government sting). If "corruptly" means only "with
improper purpose," then it adds nothing to the bribery statute in the context of these
subsections. Moreover, Section 201(b)(1)(A) demonstrates the problem with this
definition of "corruptly." In section 201(b)(1)(A), the corrupt endeavor to influence an
official act is prohibited. In this context, the offense could be stated as: "whoever
intends with an improper purpose to influence an official act has committed bribery."
The phrase "improper purpose" alone is just as vague as "corruptly." At this point, it
becomes clear that if "with improper purpose" is substituted for "corruptly," we are
faced with a construction that is either vague or entirely meaningless. 385 The statute
would become clear if it was determined that the "improper purpose" at issue is "an
effort to receive an unlawful benefit for one's self or another." Under that construction,
the benefit sought must be "unlawful" to have. In the case of bribery, it is a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 201(c) to offer anything of value to a public official. Because a person
intended to do that act, he sought an unlawful benefit, which means that he acted
corruptly.
If the language "with improper purpose" is not enough, consider the definition
"with evil or wicked intent." Our two-word phrase "corrupt[] endeavor" now means
381. Id. at 941 (Silberman, J., concurring dubitante in part and dissenting in part).
382. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (2000).
383. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(B) (2000).
384. Id. § 201(b)(l)(C).
385. The phrase "with improper purpose" is much closer to a meaningful definition than the other
definitions used amongst the circuits. It is simply too broad to have a meaningful place. Acting "with the
intent to receive an improper advantage/benefit for one's self or another" is certainly part of the set of actions
that have an improper purpose. It is simply more concise and meaningful.
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"an intent to act with an evil or wicked intent." Like the phrase "with improper
purpose," the bribery statute illustrates the futility of this definition. Attempting to
convince a public official to violate his duties or to commit a fraud against the United
States would be arguably "evil or wicked" already. It also seems like replacing
"corruptly" with other vague terms (for example, "evil" or "wicked") does not lead to
clarity.386 Rejecting those two conceptions of the term, the circuits have created other
definitions to consider. Again, "evil" and "wicked" have no fixed meaning in the
jurisprudential context. The phrase "intent to receive an unlawful/improper benefit for
one's self or another" does.
Federal courts have determined that "corruptly" may also mean "with intent to do
what the statute prohibits." This construction of "corruptly" requires the phrase
"corruptly endeavor" to mean "to intend to do what the statute prohibits." Noting that
the statute on its face prohibits "corrupt[] endeavors," it seems odd to change that text to
"endeavoring to endeavor." If "corruptly" cannot logically mean "with improper
purpose," "with evil or wicked intent," or "with intent to intend," another meaning must
be found. Having exhausted the popular but incomplete conceptions of "corruptly," the
choice left is to examine the definition used by the federal circuits consistently in the
context of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).
387
All courts that have addressed the question of "corruptly" within Section 7212(a)
have imputed to "corruptly" the meaning "an intent to receive an unlawful advantage
for one's self or another."'388 Starting with our two-word phrase "corrupt[] endeavors,"
the explanation now states, "whoever intends to do some act (prohibited by the statute)
with intent to receive an improper benefit for one's self or another." This construction
has given meaning to each part of the phrase "corruptly endeavors." As Judge Kozinski
pointed out in his dissent in United States v. Dorri, we may still have to give meaning to
"improper" and perhaps "advantage." '389 Assigning meaning to a term like "improper"
is not difficult; in fact, it may be as easy as referencing relevant codes of conduct. At its
core, conduct that is "improper" is conduct that tends to be in violation of some sort of
duty or responsibility. Those concepts, as Judge Kozinski stated, may very well differ
from one case to another.390  Regardless, the analysis for courts becomes
straightforward compared to attempting to impute meaning to definitions that are often
hopelessly circular when put into statutory context.
Over time, the lack of precision of language has decayed the term "corruptly."
Today, many people use the term as a moral judgment for the actions of another as
though it meant "improper." Yet, Congress continues to utilize the word in new
386. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("Vague terms do
not suddenly become clear when they are defined by reference to other vague terms.").
387. See supra note 92 (collecting cases showing the nine circuits that have addressed the issue resolved it
in substantially the same manner).
388. Id.
389. United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("[W]hether the
intended advantage is improper and whether the conduct is inconsistent with official duty are the very
questions we [the court] should be answering.").
390. See id. ("There's certainly a core meaning to it: Conduct is corrupt if it's an improper way for a public
official to benefit from his job. But what's improper turns on many different factors, such as tradition, context
and current attitudes about legitimate rewards for particular officeholders.").
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statutes. 391 Therefore, the courts will eventually have to step in and replant the
common law term. If the courts will not return to the English meaning of the term,
Congress must codify the meaning of the term "corruptly" within the federal code as
"an intent to secure an unlawful benefit for one's self or another."
391. In 2002, Congress passed the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002. This statute includes a
modification to 18 U.S.C. § 1512 that uses the term "corruptly":
(c) Whoever corruptly-
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to
do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official
proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 8 U.S.C. § 801 (2002).
[Vol. 3 1:1
